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This Article examines the citizen submission process
created under the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation ("NAAEC"), which, along
with the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA "), was adopted by Canada, Mexico, and the
United States in 1993. The Article details the
historical evolution ofNorth American environmental
law and diplomacy in the hundred years prior to the
adoption of NAAEC. It proceeds to analyze the
environmental provisions of NAAEC and the citizen
submissions that have been filed since NAAEC went
into effect, and undertakes an in-depth case study of
the citizen submission relating to coral reefs in
Cozumel, Mexico. The Article then compares the
enforcement record of NAAEC with the enforcement
record ofNAFTA, and argues that the legal status of
North American environmental law needs to be
strengthened so that it is equal to that of North
American trade law.
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r. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been increasing attention given to,
, and increasing debate over, the relationship between the promotion of
global trade and the protection of the natural environment. Much of
this debate has focused on the particular agreements and
organizations that establish the rules for regional and international
trade, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, 1 the
European Union,2 the southern cone market in South America,3 the
Caribbean Common Market,4 the Economic Community of West
African States,S the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
("ASEAN"),6 and globally, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"),? and the World Trade Organization ("WTO").8
Many environmentalists maintain that these agreements and
organizations undermine efforts to ensure ecologically sustainable
policies. As a result, they have called both for changes to existing
international trade agreements and for the adoption of new
international agreements to strengthen environmental protection.
This Article evaluates how the debate over the trade-
environment nexus has played out in the North American context,
particularly in the trade and environmental agreements that Canada,
1. North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican
States, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,1992,19920.1. (C224) 1,31 I.L.M. 247 (1992)
[hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
3. The Treaty of Asuncion established the South American Quadripartite Common
Market, Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR). Treaty Establishing a Common Market,
March 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991). Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed
the treaty on March 26, 1991. Id.
4. The Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), established in 1973, consists of
Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica,
Montserrat, St. Kitts, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.
Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, Annex: The Caribbean
Common Market, 12 I.L.M. 1033,1044 (1973).
5. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), May 28,
1975,1010 U.N.T.S. 17, 14 I.L.M. 1200 (1975).
6. Leo Tsao Yuan, The ASEAN Free Trade Area: The Search for a Common
Prosperity, in AsIA PACIFIC REGIONALISM: READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 319 (Ross Gamault & Peter Drysdale eds., 1994).
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-ll, T.I.A.S.
1700,55 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter GATT]; Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (making
institutional and substantive changes to the GATT treaty) [hereinafter Uruguay Round Act].
8. Under the Uruguay Round Act, supra note 7, the WTO is the organizational
successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
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Mexico and the United States signed in 1993 (the "1993 North
American Regime"). These agreements went into effect on January 1,
1994.9
The Article is divided into nine parts. Following Part I, the
Introduction, Part II provides an overview of the development of
North American environmental law and diplomacy prior to 1993.
Part ill revisits the political context in which the 1993 North
American Regime was negotiated, with particular attention to the role
of the trade-environment debate. Part IV presents a summary of
environmental law established under the 1993 North American
Regime, especially the rules and institutions created by the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation ("NAAEC").lO
Part V assesses the record of environmental enforcement under the
1993 North American Regime, in particular the effectiveness of
enforcement actions filed by private parties.
Part VI offers a case study of a recent controversy-involving
the destruction of coral reefs in Cozumel, Mexico ("Cozumel Reef
Case")-under the 1993 North American Regime. The Cozumel Reef
Case illustrates both the potential and the limitations of the 1993
North American Regime's environmental provisions. Part VII
compares the status of North American environmental law with the
status of North American trade law. The Article concludes, in Part
Vill, with recommendations for strengthening the role of North
American environmental law within the 1993 North American
Regime, and Part IX gives a brief postscript regarding relevant events
post-March 2000.
The objective of this Article is neither to condemn nor to
celebrate the 1993 North American Regime. Rather, it is to highlight
the fact that the environmental provisions of the 1993 North
American Regime are part of a larger diplomatic, historical, and legal
process. This process is the emergence of North American
environmental law as a distinct regional component of both
international environmental law specifically and international law in
general. This process began long before the 1993 North American
Regime was adopted, and it is certain to continue long into the future.
The Cozumel Reef Case, therefore, is neither the beginning nor the
culmination of North American environmental law. However, the
case does provide us with an opportunity to take stock of where we
9. Craig M. Cibak, Implications ofInternational Environmental Agreements Between
the U.S. and Mexico, 17lNT'LENVTL. REp. (BNA) 334 (1994).
10. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993) [hereinafter NAAEC].
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have been and where we are now, so that we can better detennine
where we need to go.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND DIPLOMACY BEFORE 1993
The origins of North American environmental law go back
more than a century. 11 The focus of the early efforts was less on
developing binding provisions than on establishing a diplomatic
framework for infonnation-gathering and cooperation. The ftrst
major attempt at international conservation in North America began
in 1892, when Canada and the United States created a joint
commission to investigate the problem of overftshing in boundary
waters. 12 Sharp declines in the ftshery resources of the St. Croix
River/Passamaquaddy Bay region in the East, the Great Lakes in the
Midwest, and the Puget Sound/Fraser River region in the. West
prompted the commission's creation.B In. 1896, the commission's
investigations resulted in the publication of the Report of the Joint
Commission Relative to the Preservation of the Fisheries in Waters
Contiguous to Canada and the United States ("1896 Contiguous
Fisheries Report,,).14 Following the report's publication, Canada and
the United States began negotiations for an fuland Fisheries Treaty.lS
Although the negotiations ultimately proved unsuccessful; the
collaborative scientiftc commission served as a model for future
North American conservation efforts.16
The second major development in the fteld ofNorth American
environmental law took place in 1893 and involved a dispute between
Canada and the United States over seal hunting in the Bering Sea.
The seals in question were born on U.S.-owned islands, but ,spent
most of their lives in international waters. U.S. seal hunters claimed
pennanent possession of the seals due to the seals' birthplace, while
Canadian seal hunters asserted the right to capture the seals on the
11. See Catherine A. Cooper, The Management of International Environmental
Disputes in the Context of Canada-United States Relations: A Survey and Evaluation of
Techniques and Mechanisms, CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 247 (1986).
12. KURKPATRICKDORSEY, THE DAWN OF CONSERVATION DIPLOMACY: U.S.-CANADIAN
WILDLIFE PROTECTION 'fREATIES IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 4D-41 (1998).
13. Id. at 33-39.
14. Id. at 42.
15. Id. at 51-104.
16. Id.
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high seas.17 As a result, both the Canadians and the United States
refused to reduce the number of seals that they could kill and, by the
1880s, only ten percent of the Bering Sea seal population remained.18
In 1893, in an effort to resolve the conflict, Canada and the United
States afeed to submit the dispute to an arbitration panel in Paris,
France.1 The 1893 Bering Sea Arbitration Tribunal rejected the rigid
positions of both countries and held that a joint conservation strategy
was required.2o Although the tribunal's decision did not originally
satisfy either Canada or the United States, it played a critical role in
helping the nations eventually to negotiate a bilateral treaty to resolve
the issue.21
The third early milestone in North American environmental
diplomacy occurred in 1909, when U.S. President Theodore
Roosevelt organized the International North American Conference on
the Conservation ofNatural Resources.22 The conference, which took
place in Washington, D.C., brought together leading conservationists
and scientists from Canada, Mexico, and the United States, and
resulted in the adoption of a Declaration of Principles.23 Although
the Declaration of Principles did not set forth specific obligations, the
1909 conference was still politically significant in that it helped
establish conservation and environmental protection as legitimate
goals for international diplomacy.24 It therefore served as an
important precedent for the adoption of future bilateral and trilateral
environmental treaties in North America.
Between Canada and the United States, the environmental
treaties signed between 1909 and 1993 include: the 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty;25 the 1911 North Pacific Fur Seal Convention;26 the
17. Id. at 105.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 119-24.
20. FUR SEAL ARBITRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL OF ARBITRATION (1892).
21. "The arbitrators managed to reach a decision that annoyed the Americans and
Canadians. . .. In attempting to accommodate both sides, the arbitrators had acknowledged
that the status quo was unacceptable." DORSEY, supra note 12, at 122-23.
22. LANE SIMONIAN, DEFENDING THE LAND OF THE JAGUAR: A HISTORY OF
CONSERVATION IN MExIco 76 (1995).
23. Joseph F. DiMento & Pamela M. Doughman, Soft Teeth in the Back ofthe Mouth:
The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement Implemented, 10 GEO. !NT'L ENVTL. L. REv.
651,654 n.17 (1998).
24. Richard Kiy & John D. Wirth, Introduction, in ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ON
NORTH AMERICA'S BORDERS 3, 14 (1998).
25. Treaty Between Canada and the United States of America Relating to Boundary
Waters and Questions Arising Along the Boundary Between the United States and Canada,
Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-U.K., 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. 548.
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1937 Treaty Creating the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries
Commission;27 the 1972 Great Lakes Quality Agreement;28 the 1978
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement;29 the 1980 Memorandum
Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution;30 the 1985 Pacific Salmon
Treaty;31 the 1987 Agreement on Caribou Conservation;32 and the
1991 United States-Canada Bilateral Air Quality Agreement,33
Between Mexico and the United States, the environmental treaties
signed between 1909 and 1993 include: the 1927 and 1931 Mexico-
United States agreements to establish a joint fishery commission;34
the 1935 Mexico-United States agreement to establish an international
parks commission;35 the 1944 Mexico-United States water treaty;36
and the 1983 La Paz Agreement,37
In addition to the bilateral diplomatic developments and
treaties discussed above, Canada, Mexico, and the United States also
adopted two significant trilateral environmental agreements in the
pre-1993 period. Those trilateral agreements are the 1986 North
26. Treaty for the Preservation and Protection ofFur Seals, July 7, 1911,37 Stat. 1542.
27. A good historical overview of the treaty is provided in JOHN F. Roos, RESTORING
FRASER RIvER SALMON: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES
COMMISSION (1991).
28. Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Apr. 15, 1972, U.S.-Can., 23 U.S,T. 301,
T.I.A.S. No. 7312.
29. Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Great Lakes
Water Quality, 1978, Nov. 22, 1978, U.S.-Can., 30 U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257.
30. Memorandum of Intent Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government ofCanada Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug. 5, 1980, U.S.-
Can., 32 U.S.T. 2521, T.I.A.S. No. 9856.
31. Treaty Concerning Pacific Salmon, Mar. 28, 1985, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11091;
see generally Marlyn Twitchell, Implementing the u.S.-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty: The
Struggle to Move from Fish Wars to Cooperative Fishery Management, 20 OCEAN DEY. &
INT'LL. 409 (1989).
32. Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada on Conservation of
the Porcupine Caribou Herd, July 17, 1987, U.S.-Can, T.I.A.S. 11259.
33. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government ofCanada on Air Quality, Mar. 13,1991, U.S.-Can., 30 I.L.M. 676 (1991).
34. See SIMONIAN, supra note 22, at 105.
35. See id. at 100.
36. Utilization ofWaters ofColorado and Tijuana Rivers and ofthe Rio Grande, Feb. 3,
1944, U.S.-Mex., T.S. 994, 3U.N.T.S. 313.
37. Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States
on Coopemtion for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area,
Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10827,35 U.S.T. 2916, 22 I.L.M. 1025 (1983).
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American Waterfowl Management Plan38 and the Migratory Birds
Treaty.39
In reviewing the development of North American
environmental law and diplomacy prior to 1993, two important
patterns can be noted. First, almost all of the treaties and diplomatic
developments in this period involved transboundary natural resources.
For instance, the 1972 Great Lakes Quality Agreement, the 1978
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, the 1980 Memorandum
Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, the 1991 United States-
Canada Bilateral Air Quality Agreement, and the 1983 La Paz
Agreement all dealt exclusively with the problem of cross-border
pollution. Similarly, the 1893 Bering Sea Arbitration Tribunal,40 the
1896 Contiguous Fisheries Report/H the 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty, the 1911 North Pacific Fur Seal Convention, the 1937 Treaty
Creating the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, the
1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty, the 1987 Agreement on Caribou
Conservation, and the Migratory Birds Treaty all dealt exclusively
with species that migrate across national borders.
In the pre-1993 period, North American environmental law
was limited primarily to environmental and natural resource issues
that were physically transnational. Conversely, it did not attempt to
deal with environmental and natural issues that were economically or
politically transnational. For instance, in the pre-1993 period, North
American environmental law did not address the ways in which
foreign investment, international competitiveness, or harmonization
of national standards can impact natural resource conservation or
environmental protection. These economic and political issues are at
the center of the current trade-environment debate, but were not part
of the earlier diplomatic landscape.
The second pattern that can be noted in the pre-1993 period is
the important role that non-profit environmental organizations and
38. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 1994 UPDATE TO THE NORTH AMERICAN
WATERFOWL MANAGEMENT PLAN: ExpANDING THE COMMITMENT 4-5, 29-30 (1994).
39. Convention on the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-U.K., 39
Stat. 1702, T.S. 628. Canada and the United States signed this migratory birds treaty in 1916,
and Mexico and the United States signed a treaty on the same subject in 1936. Convention
Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States for the Protection of
Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, Feb. 7, 1936, 50 Stat. 1311, T.S. 912, discussed in
Croig D. Sjostrom, OfBirds and Men: The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 26lDAHO L. REv. 371,
374 (1990). Technically, the Migratory Birds Treaty is not atrue trilateral treaty, but rother
two nearly identical bilaterol agreements between the United States and Canada, and between
the United States and Mexico.
40. Supra note 20.
41. Supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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private scientific organizations played in the diplomatic negotiations.
Political activism by environmental groups is not a new phenomenon,
but rather has been a constant since the early beginnings of North
American environmental law. For instance, in the late 1890s, one of
the driving forces behind the negotiations for an Inland Fis,heries
Treaty was the American Fisheries Society, a private professional
organization of scientists.42 As Kurkpatrick Dorsey, professor of
environmental history at the University of New Hampshire, noted in
his 1998 book The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy: UNITED
STATES-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive
Era, "the American Fisheries Society set a precedent by daring to
offer its expertise in a field about which the negotiators knew little.
For the first time, a scientific and conservation organization was
attempting to influence the course of international natural resource
protection.,,43 The National Audubon Society and the American
Ornithologists' Union played a similar role in securing Canadian and
American adoption of the Migratory Birds Treaty in 1916, by
conducting independent research on the economic benefits of birds to
agriculture, and extensive public education and lobbying efforts.44
As we turn to the environmental and political context of the
negotiations over the 1993 North American Regime, we see these
dynamics repeated. As with the American Fisheries Society and the
National Audubon nearly a century ago, the role of non-profit
environmental organizations once again proved pivotal in the 1993
negotiations.45
42. DORSEY, supra note 12, at 54-55.
43. Id. at 55.
44. Id. at 175,216-21.
45. It may be tempting to look at this modern horse-trading and conclude that it is a new
phenomenon, a post-Earth Day manifestation ofthe importance of the environmentalist
movement. But, in fact, modem environmentalists are following in the footsteps ofthe
conservationists of the Progressive era, who themselves learned tough lessonS about
placing their issues on the diplomatic agenda
Id. at 3. In addition, "the leaders ofthe Progressive conservationists faced many of the same
hurdles that loom today-dissent in the movement, fierce economic opposition from people
fearful for their livelihoods, apathy among the general public, favoritism toward certain
issues and species, skepticism from diplomats, and legal challenges." Id. at 18.
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ill. THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT OF THE 1993 NORTH
AMERICAN REGIME NEGOTIATIONS
The origins of the 1993 North American Regime go back to
the late 1980s, when U.S. President George Bush proposed creating a
North American free trade zone with Canada and Mexico.46 Bush
developed his proposal in response to the trade blocs that were
forming in Europe via the European Union, and in Asia via ASEAN.
At that time, there was a perception that the global trade regime, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), was becoming
weaker and the United States would find itself increasingly excluded
from the emerging European and Asian regional trade blocs. Bush's
proposal for a North American Free Trade Agreement (''NAFTA''~
was viewed as a means to counter the European Union and ASEAN.4
President Bush and Mexico's President Carlos Salinas de Gortari
formally committed to the idea of a comprehensive free trade
agreement in June of 1990, and Canada's Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney committed three months later.48
When NAFTA negotiations began, the relationship between
trade liberalization and environmental protection was not high on the
policy agenda. In the early 1990s, however, the situation changed due
to two significant developments. First, in 1991, a GATT dispute
panel ruled that a U.S. law to protect dolphins violated international
trade rules.49 This GATT ruling held that, under international trade
rules, nations were not permitted to adopt laws that related to natural
resources located outside national boundaries, or conditioned imports
on how products were produced. The GATT's dolphin decision was
intensely criticized by environmentalists, both in the United States
and abroad.50 Second, in the summer of 1992, the U.N. Conference
on Environment and Development ("UNCED") took place in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazi1.51 At UNCED, several new international agreements,
46. JOHN R. MAcARTHUR, THE SELLING OF FREE TRADE: NAFTA, WASHINGTON, AND
THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 93 (2000).
47. ld. at 92.
48. Earl H. Fry, A Continent ofFree Trade: Negotiations Toward a North American
Free Trade Agreement, 64 J. STATE GoV'T 128 (1991).
49. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Dispute Settlement Panel Report on
United States Restrictions on Imports ofTuna, Aug. 16, 1991,30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991).
50. Donald M. Goldberg, GAIT Tuna-Dolphin II: Environmental Protection Continues
to Clash with Free Trade, BRIEF (Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. Law, Wash., D.C.), June, 1994, at 1, 2-
3.
406 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [39:395
which recognized the importance of integrating the goals of
environmental protection and economic development, emerged.52
Taken together, the GATT dolphin ruling and UNCED
resulted in a new public and policy focus on the environmental
impacts of international trade, and calls for those concerns to be
addressed in the context of the NAFTA negotiations. President Bush
resisted these calls, however, taking the position that NAFTA was not
the proper forum for dealing with environmental issues. With
environmental and labor issues kept off the table, the negotiations for
NAFTA were completed on August 12, 1992.
President Bush's refusal to expand NAFTA's substantive
negotiations beyond the goal of trade liberalization led most
environmental organizations in Canada, Mexico, and United States to
aggressively oppose the proposed trade agreement. This grassroots
opposition began to translate into political opposition, particularly in
Canada and the United States. By the time NAFTA negotiations were
completed, there were increasing indications that the Canadian Senate
and the U.S. Congress might reject the treaty. Confronted with this
opposition, on September 16, 1992-one month after the NAFTA
negotiations were completed-the Administrator of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the Environment
Ministers from Canada and Mexico initiated negotiations to cr~ate a
new trilateral environmental "counciI."s3 The parameters of this
proposed council were vague, however, and many environmentalists
viewed the proposal as an afterthought-as a political bone thrown to
environmentalists to dampen opposition to the free trade agre~ment.
Regardless of the motivations behind the initiation of negotiations to
create a North American environmental council, the mere fact that
these negotiations were deemed politically necessary to secure
adoption ofNAFTA is significant. More specifically, the initiation of
51. C. FORD RUNGE, FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING TRADE
LIBERALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS 88 (1994) ("The United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio De Janeiro in June 1992, resulted
in a broad new mandate for environmental action, Agenda 21, together with the creation ofa
the new U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development").
52. The international agreements signed at UNCED included the Convention on
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 21 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter Biodiversity
Convention]; Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No.
102-38 (1992), 31 LL.M. 849 (1992); Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of
Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable
Development of all Types of Forests, 31 I.L.M. 881 (1992), U.N. Doc.
AlCONF.151I26/Annex III (Vol. III); Agenda 21.
53. Gilbert R. Winbarn, Enforcement of Environmental Measures: Negotiating the
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement, 3 J. ENV'T & DEV. 1 (1994).
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these environmental negotiations indicates that between 1990 and
1992, the public increasingly came to view trade integration and
environmental protection as interrelated, rather than independent,
policy issues.
When William Clinton campaigned for President of the United
States in the fall of 1992, he pledged to make environmental and labor
issues an integral part of NAFTA negotiations.54 After defeating
George Bush in the 1992 election, President Clinton made good on
his campaign promise by announcing that he would refuse to sign
NAFTA unless parallel agreements on the environment and labor
were signed at the same time.55 In March of 1993, Clinton's
announcement led to the initiation of negotiations to draft two new
treaties, the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (''NAAEC'')56 and the North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation (''NAALC'').57 Under Clinton's policy of linkage,
it was envisioned that NAFTA, NAAEC, and NAALC would form
the elements of a new North American Regime. The NAAEC and
NAALC negotiations were completed on August 13, 1993, and in
September 1993, President Clinton, President Salinas, and Prime
Minister Jean Chretien agreed to sign the agreements.58
Aside from the general impetus provided by the 1991 GATT
dolphin ruling and the 1992 UNCED, there were other regionally-
specific environmental issues that affected the negotiations of the
North American Regime. Four issues in particular served to highlight
the potential for trade liberalization to undercut efforts to improve
environmental protection in North America. First, in the mid-1980s,
Mexico established a program to provide incentives, namely low
taxes, low export tariffs, and low labor costs, for American companies
to set up industrial factories in Mexico along the United States-
Mexico border. These U.S.-owned factories were called
maquiladoras. In the late 1980s, reports began to surface about the
dumping of untreated toxic waste and horrific health conditions
54. See MACARTHUR, supra note 46, at 164-66.
55. Jack I. Garvey, Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute Resolution Under the
NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and Environment, 89 AM. J. INT'LL. 439, 440 (1995).
56. NAAEC, supra note 10. In addition to the NAAEC, a special agreement on the
U.S.-Mexico border area was also negotiated, creating the Border Environment Cooperation
Commission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADBank).
BECC/NADBank did not set forth any new substantive rules, but rather created a process to
direct funds to cleaning up existing environmental problems along the border.
57. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
32I.L.M. 1499 (1993).
58. DiMento & Doughman, supra note 23, at 673.
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caused by the maquiladoras.59 These reports indicated that, in
addition to the low taxes, low export tariffs and low labor costs, U.S.
companies were also taking advantage of the lax environmental
standards and lax enforcement of environmental laws in Mexico to
reduce their production costs.60 The border conditions near the
maquiladoras were seen as a preview to what might happen to the rest
ofMexico under NAFTA.61
Second, beginning in the 1980s, the Canadian province of
British Columbia ("B.C.") began to accelerate and intensify logging
of forests on provincial land, mostly through the use of clearcut
logging.62 Most of the forests in B.C. are old-growth temperate
rainforests, like those found in Washington, Oregon, and Northern
California. The provincial government in B.C. supported this logging
by providing the B.C. timber industry with cheap access to public
provincial forests, and by refusing to impose even minimal
environmental restrictions on logging.63 The U.S. market for paper
and lumber was one of the driving market forces behind the logging
in B.C.64 Moreover, the low environmental standards of the B.C.
logging industry were making it increasingly difficult for the U.S.
logging industry to compete, and hence the U.S. logging industry was
strongly resisting efforts to strengthen forest protection policies. The
U.S. controversy over the logging offorests and spotted owl habitat in
the Pacific Northwest, which reached it climax in the early 1990s,
. was closely related to this issue.65
Third, there was concern in Canada about the use of certain
agricultural pesticides in the United States.66 Many pesticides that are
59. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Rose, Transboundary Harm: Hazardous Waste Management
Problems and Mexico Maquiladoras, 23 INT'LL. 223 (1989).
60. JOEL SIMON, ENDANGERED MExIco: AN ENVIRONMENT ON TIlE EDGE 211 (1997)
(stating "conditions in Mexican maquiladoras, which had been the focus of a few regional
activists, became a national concern and a symbol of everything that was wroog with
NAFTA").
61. Marianne Lavelle, Poisoned Waters Provide Early Test for NAFTA, NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 21, 1994, at AI.
62. Derek Denniston, The Temperate Rainforest: Canada's Clearcut Secret, WORLD
WATCH, July-Aug. 1993, at9.
63. ld. at 9, 34.
64. See Christopher Genovali, Horror Show: The British Columbia Chainsaw
Massacre, SAN FRAN. EXAMINER, Jan. 20, 1994, at A21; Christopher Genovali, Canada's
Forests: An Ecological Holocaust, SAN FRAN. EXAMINER, Feb. 4, 1993, at A19.
65. See generally STEVEN L. YAFFEE, THE WISDOM OF TIlE SPOTTED OWL: POLICY
LESSONS FOR ANEW CENTURY (1994).
66. See Steven Shrybman, Trading away the Environment, WORLD POL'y J., Winter
1991-1992, at 105 (''The difference between the two [pesticide approval] approaches ...
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permitted in the United States are banned in Canada, because of their
health impacts on consumers and because of their impacts on the
environment.67 In Canada, there was concern that, under NAFTA,
there would be political pressure on Canada to lower its pesticide
standards to allow U.S. agricultural finns to more easily export farm
products to Canada.68 There was also concern that, under NAFTA,
Canada's pesticide restrictions could be directly challenged as an
unjustified trade barrier.
Fourth and finally, in Mexico and the United States there were
legal challenges to the environmental adequacy of the NAFTA
negotiations. In 1993, the Mexico City-based National Association of
Ecological Organizations filed a complaint with Mexico's federal
attorney general, alleging that the national ecology law required the
preparation of an environmental impact statement ("EIS") before
NAFTA could be ratified.69 Mexico's attorney general rejected the
complaint, finding that the adoption of NAFTA did not qualify as a
specific project or activity under the national ecology law and,
therefore, did not require an EIS.70
In August of 1991, the Washington D.C.-based organization
Public Citizen filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Trade Representative
("USTR") in federal district court.?1 The Public Citizen lawsuit
alleged that, under the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"), the USTR was required to prepare an EIS on NAFTA
before submitting the treaty to Congress for approval. NEPA requires
that an EIS be prepared for major federal actions that can have
significant effects on the human environment. The lawsuit was
initially dismissed as premature, because the NAFTA negotiations
had not yet been completed. After the NAFTA negotiations were
finished, however, Public Citizen refiled its lawsuit. On June 10,
explains why there are twenty percent more active pesticide ingredients registered for use in
the United States and over seven times as many pesticide products.").
67. Id.
68. DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY 220 (1995) (The "commitment to the harmonizing of American and
Canadian pesticide standards particularly worried Canadian environmentalists, since they
considered American standards to be too lax. Pesticide approval in the United States is based
on a balancing of risks and benefits, while the Canadian Pest Control Products Act only
focuses on the safety ofthe proposed pesticide.").
69. Mexican Ecology Groups File Complaint to Force Impact Statement on NAFTA
Accord, 16lNT'LENVTL. REp. (BNA) 646 (1993).
70. Mexican Official Rejects Complaint Calling for Environmental Impact Statement,
16 INT'LENVTL. REp. (BNA) 671 (1993).
71. Public Citizen v. Office U.S. Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C.
1992), ajJ'd on other grounds, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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1993, the federal district court ruled in Public Citizen's favor, holding
that the USTR was required to prepare an EIS before submitting
NAFTA to the U.S. Congress.72 On September 24, 1993, however,
the U.S. Court of Ap~eals for the District of Columbia reversed the
district court's ruling. 3
Although the legal challenges by the National Organization of
Ecological Organizations and Public Citizen did not prove successful
in the courts, they were effective in a broader sense. These legal
challenges focused political and media attention on the environmental
dimensions of NAFTA, particularly on the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation negotiations, which were
taking place at the time the complaints were filed and pending.74
The concerns and events discussed above led
environmentalists in North America to challenge and critique many of
the proposed NAFTA provisions. As a result, North American
environmentalists were able to obtain new rules and institutions in the
NAAEC.75 These changes led some environmental organizations,
such as the Environmental Defense Fund, the World Wildlife Fund,
the National Wildlife Federation, and the Natural Resources Defense
Council, to withdraw their opposition to NAFTA.76 For instance, in
hearings before the U.S. House ofRepresentatives, Stewart Hudson of
the National Wildlife Federation argued that the revised North
American Regime stands in "stark contrast to the status quo, where
environmental concerns are largely ignored in commerce between
nations, where lax. enforcement of environmental laws goes
unchecked, and where citizen input into trade and environment issues
is shut out."77
Other environmental organizations, however, including the
Sierra Club, Greenpeace, Public Citizen, the Canadian Environmental
Law Association and Association de Grupo Ambientalistes (a
network of Mexican environmental groups), concluded that the
72. Public Citizen v. Office U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993).
73. Public Citizen v. Office U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
For an analysis of the NEPA-NAFTA litigation, see Steve Charnovitz, No Timefor NEPA:
Trade Agreements on a Fast Track, 3MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 195 (1994).
74. DiMento & Doughman, supra note 23, at 663.
75. Id. at 662-77.
76. MARy E. KELLY, NAFTA's ENVIRONMENTAL SIDE AGREEMENT: A REVIEW AND
ANALYSIS 1-2 (1993).
77. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Supplemental Agreements to
NAFTA: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and
Means, H.R. Doc. No. 103-48 (1993) (Statement of Steward Hudson, Legislative
Representative, NWF).
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changes were more rhetorical than substantive, and that support for
the revised North American Regime could still not be justified.78 As
a 1992 report by the Canadian Environmental Law Association stated,
"nothing in the so-called NAFTA side agreements or the proposed
North American Commission can fix the environmental problems that
will flow from NAFTA.,,79 Canadian, Mexican, and American
organizations opposed to the revised North American Regime formed
the Citizens Trade Campaign to coordinate their political efforts to
prevent legislative adoption of the agreements.80
The division within the environmental community
significantly weakened one of the interest groups that had formerly
opposed approval of NAFTA.81 As a result, the efforts of Citizens
Trade Campaign fell just short. Although the vote was close, 234 to
200, the U.S. House of Representatives approved the revised North
American Regime, which included NAFTA, the NAAEC, and the
NAALC, on November 17, 1993.82 Mexico's Senate ~proved the
revised North American Regime in November 1993.8 Canada's
Senate followed in December of the same year.84
N. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW UNDER THE 1993 NORTH AMERICAN
REGIME
The 1993 North American Regime created many new
provisions and institutions relating to environmental protection.
These included environmental provisions in NAFTA's preamble and
78. See PIERRE MARc JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA:
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 32 (1996).
79. Id. at 34 (quoting CANADIAN ENVTL. L. AsS'N, NAFTA AND THE DEMOCRATIC
PROCESS (1992)).
80. Keith Schneider, Environmental Groups Are Split on Support/or Free Trade Pact,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1993, at AI.
81. VOGEL, supra note 68, at 237 ("[1]he President had succeeded in splitting the
environmental movement. The support of the NRDC and the NWF played a critical role in
securing congressional approval ....").
82. 139 Congo Rec. HI0, 048. It is interesting to note that NAFTA, the NAAEC and
the NAALC, were not formerly ratified as a treaty by the constitutionally required two-thirds
vote of the U.S. Senate. Rather, they were simply approved by a Congressional majority as a
"congressional-executive agreement." For a detailed analysis of the constitutionality of
congressional-executive agreements, such as NAFTA, see Bruce Ackerman, Is NAFTA
Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REv. 801 (1995).
83. Mexican Senate Approves NAFTA, 53 FACTS ON FILE No. 2756 (Nov. 25,1993), at
875.
84. Canada Commits to NAFTA, 53 FACTS ON FILE No. 2770 (Dec. 31,1993), at 963.
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Chapter 7, the creation of the Border Environment Cooperation
Commission ("BECC"),85 and the creation of the North American
Development Bank ("NADBank,,)86 to support cleanup projects along
the United States-Mexico border. The North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (''NAAEC'') created the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation ("CEC") and its Council of Ministers,87
Secretariat,88 and Joint Public Advisory Committee ("JPAC"),89 and
created the National Advisory Committees (''NACs,,).90 Although all
of the above-listed provisions and institutions focused on the issue of
environmental protection, most of them cannot be accurately
described as legal provisions or institutions, in that they do not set
forth new, binding environmental standards for Canada, Mexico, and
the United States.
For instance, NAFTA's preamble requires Canada, Mexico,
and the United States to undertake economic activities "in a manner
consistent with environmental protection and conservation" and to
"strengthen the development and enforcement of environmental laws
and regulations." Article 1114 of NAFTA "recognizes that it is
inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health,
safety or environmental measures." Although this environmental
language may be encouraging, it does not provide an appropriate legal
basis for bringing a claim before the Free Trade Commission ("FTC")
created under NAFTA.91 As another example, the BECC and
NADBank create a means to fmance border cleanup projects, but they
do not set forth any new substantive obligations on Canada, Mexico,
or the United States. Similarly, although the JPAC and NACs can
85. SIMON, supra note 60, at 227 ("The other environmental agency created under
NAFTA was the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), a binational (the
United States and Mexico) agency based in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, and empowered to
evaluate funding for environmental infrastructure projects along the border. Projects
approved by the BECC are eligible to receive low-interest loans from the North American
Development Bank, a lending institution also created under the free-trade accord, which has
its offices in San Antonio, Texas.").
86. Id.
87. NAAEC, supra note 10, art. 9.
88. Id. art. 11.
89. /d. art. 16.
90. Id. art. 17.
91. See David G. Schiller, Great Expectations: The North American Commission on
Environmental Cooperation Review of the Cozumel Pier Submission, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REv. 437, 477 (1997) ("While NAFTA includes general references to the
commitment of its members to the environment, it neither creates substantive obligations nor
provides a dispute resolution process for environmental matters. Thus, the countries cannot
look to NAFTA to provide guidance in resolving environmental disputes among
themselves.").
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offer input to the CEC, these institutions do not have the authority to
adopt or enforce any measures that would be binding on Canada,
Mexico, or the United States.
The fact that BECC, NADBank, JPAC, and the NACs, and
most of NAFTA do not set forth binding substantive environmental
standards, or that they are unenforceable, does not mean that these
agreements and institutions are unimportant from an environmental
policy perspective. These agreements and institutions can still
establish soft norms and general principles that may help shape how
Canada, Mexico, and the United States approach and resolve
environmental protection issues, both within their borders and within
the context of the 1993 North American Regime. These agreements
and institutions can also provide a means to share environmental
information and to finance border cleanup and other environmental
projects.92 However, the focus of this Article is specifically on North
American environmental law, not on the more general topic of the
development of North American environmental cooperation and
environmental institutions. As such, the analysis of the 1993 North
American Regime will center on the development of enforceable legal
standards regarding environmental protection.
NAFTA contains some substantive environmental provisions,
such as Chapter 7, which provides that each nation has the right to
establish its own sanitary and phytosanitary standards (public health
measures) so long as these standards are based on scientific
principles, and Chapter 9, which provides that each nation has the
right to establish its own environmental standards provided that these
standards are adopted in furtherance of a legitimate objective.
Chapter 7 and Chapter 9 could be relied upon if a public health or
environmental law were challenged before NAFTA's Free Trade
Commission. Aside from the NAFTA provisions mentioned above,
however, most of the substantive legal environmental provisions in
the 1993 North American Regime are set forth in the NAAEC. These
provisions are discussed below.
The core legal provisions of the NAAEC involve the
establishment of new North American environmental institutions, the
creation of new substantive environmental obligations, and the
development of new enforcement procedures. Institutionally, the
centerpiece of the NAAEC is the Commission for Environmental
92. For an analysis of BECC and NADBank's potential role in improving border
environmental conditions, see generally Lawrence J. Rowe, NAFTA, the Border Area
Environmental Program, and Mexico's Border Area: Prescription for Sustainable
Development?, 18 SUFFOLK 'TRANSNAT'LL. REv. 197,217-34 (1995).
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Cooperation ("CEC"), headquartered in Montreal, Quebec.93 The
CEC has three main institutional components: (1) the Council of
Ministers, composed of the senior environmental ministers/officials
from Canada, Mexico, and the United States;94 (2) the Secretariat, the
administrative body of the CEC, with an Executive Director
appointed directly by the Council of Ministers ("Council,,);95 and (3)
JPAC, a fifteen person advisory committee comprised of five non-
governmental representatives from each of the signatories.96 Because
the Council meets only once a year, and because JPAC has only
advisory responsibilities, most of the substantive work of the, CEC,
and of implementing the NAAEC, is delegated to the Secretariat.
The key substantive legal provisions in the NAAEC are set
forth in Articles 5(1), 5(2), 6(1), 6(2), 7(3), and 7(4). Article 5(1)
requires each Party to effectively enforce its environmental laws and
regulations. Article 5(2) further requires each Party to ensure that
'judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative enforcement proceedings
are available under its laws to sanction or remedy violations of its
environmental laws and regulations." Article 6(1) provides that
"[e]ach party shall ensure that interested persons may request the
Party's competent authorities to investigate alleged violations of its
environmental law and regulations and shall give such requests due
consideration in accordance with the law." Additionally, Article
(6)(2) states that "[e]ach Party shall ensure that persons with a legally
recognized interest under its law in a particular matter have
appropriate access to administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial
proceedings for the enforcement of the Party's environmental laws
and regulations." Article 7(3) requires that "[e]ach Party shall
provide, as appropriate, that parties to such proceedings have the
right, in accordance with its law, to seek review and, where
warranted, correction of final decisions issued in such proceedings."
Finally, Article 7(4) requires each Party to ensure that "tribunals that
conduct or review such proceedings are impartial and independent
and do not have any substantial interest in the outcome of the matter."
In terms of ensuring compliance with substantive
environmental provisions, the NAAEC sets forth two separate
procedures-one for government enforcement actions and another for
private enforcement actions. The procedures for govefQ.111ent
enforcement actions, meaning actions brought by Canada, Mexi90, or
93. NAAEC, supra note 10, art. 8.
94. ld. arts. 9-10.
95. ld. art. II.
96. ld. art. 16.
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the United States, are provided in Article 24. Article 24 states that
Canada, Mexico, and the United States may request the Council of
Ministers to convene an arbitration panel to consider whether one of
the other Parties has engaged in a "persistent pattern of failure to
effectively enforce its environmental laws."97 If two-thirds of the
Council of Ministers votes to approve the request, then an arbitration
panel is convened to consider the allegation. Under the government
enforcement procedures provided in Article 24, the maximum penalty
that can be imposed against a Party found in violation of the NAAEC
is US $20 million.98
The procedures for private enforcement actions under
NAAEC are provided in Article 14. Article 14 provides that "[t]he
Secretariat may consider a submission from any non-governmental
organization or person asserting that a Party is failing to effectively
enforce its environmental laws." Upon submission of an Article 14
petition, the Secretariat must then determine whether or not the
submission merits a response from the Party alleged to be in violation
of the NAAEC. If the Secretariat determines that no response is
necessary, and the submission need not be considered, it must set
forth its position in a "determination."99
If the Secretariat determines that a response is merited, the
Party alleged to be in violation of the NAAEC has 60 days to prepare
and submit a response. IOO If the Secretariat, after review of the
response, determines that additional investigation is warranted,
Article 15 provides that the Secretariat may request that the Council
97. Id. art. 24.
If the matter has not been resolved within 60 days after the Council has
convened pursuant to Article 23, the Council shall, on the written request of any
consulting Party and by a two-thirds vote, convene an arbitral panel to consider
the matter where the alleged persistent pattern of failure by the Party to
effectively enforce its environmental laws related to a situation involving
workplace, firms, companies or sectors that produce good or provide services:
(a) traded between the territories of the Parties; or (b) that compete, in the
territory of the Party complained against, with goods and services produced or
provided by persons ofanother Party.
Id. art. 24(1).
98. Id. Annex 34.
99. Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Guidelines for Submissions on
Enforcement Matters Under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, §§ 6.1, 8.1 (June 28, 1999), available at
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guide.cfin?varlan=english (last visited Jan. 2, 2001), reprinted in
COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, BRINGING THE FACTS TO LIGHT: A GUIDE
TO ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION (2000) [hereinafter Article 14 and 15 Guidelines].
100. Id. § 9.2.
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approve, by a two-thirds vote, the preparation of a "factual record" of
the dispute.101 This request to the Council is set forth in a
"determination."102 If authorized by the Council, this factual record
will evaluate the factual and legal basis for the Article 14 petition.
The final version of the Secretariat's factual record may be approved
by a two-thirds vote of the CEC's Counci1.103
Beyond publication of the factual record by the CEC, there are
no other penalties or sanctions available to private parties for
enforcing the NAAEC's provisions, nor are there procedures to
ensure actual implementation of any recommendations that may be
set forth in the factual record.
V. THE 1993 NORTH AMERICAN REGIME: RECORD ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
An evaluation of enforcement of the NAAEC's substantive
legal provisions is limited to an evaluation of the private enforcement
submissions brought under Article 14 because, to date, Canada,
Mexico, and the United States have not filed a single arbitration panel
request under Article 24.104 The absence of any government
enforcement actions is significant. It points to two possible
conclusions, neither of which is particularly encouraging from an
environmental standpoint. First, the lack of Article 24 requests could
imply that the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States
do not believe that there are any significant problems with the
enforcement of national environmental laws. Such a belief would
also suggest that these governments probably saw little need for the
NAAEC in the first place. Second, the lack of Article 24 requests
101. "If the Secretariat considers that the submission, in light of any response provided
by the Party, warrants developing a factual record, the Secretariat shall so inform the Council
and provide its reasons." NAAEC, supra note 10, art. 15(1). "The Secretariat shall prepare a
factual record ifthe Council, by a two-thirds vote, instructs it to do so." ld. art. 15(2). '
102. Article 14 and 15 Guidelines, supra note 99.
103. NAAEC, supra note 10, art. 15(7).
104. Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness, and
Hannonization: Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements, 21 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REv. 265, 316 (1997) (reporting that no CEC environmental arbitration panels have been
called since the 1993 North American Regime went into effect); see also David Lopez,
Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early Experience, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J.
163, 188 (1997) (stating that "[n]o NAFTA country formally has alleged that another country
has engaged in a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental laws;
thus, the elaborate dispute settlement mechanism that begins with Article 22 consultations
remains untested").
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could imply that, notwithstanding enforcement problems, the three
governments are not willing politically to treat the NAAEC as a
legally binding agreement, preferrin~ instead to view it simply as an
expression ofaspirational principles. 05
Regardless of which explanation one accepts, the absence of
any attempts at enforcement by Canada, Mexico, or the United States
lends credence to some of the arguments made by the environmental
groups that initially opposed adoption of the 1993 North American
Regime. To recall, these groups maintained that the NAAEC's
provisions were more rhetorical than substantive, and that the primary
political objective of these provisions was to facilitate the legislative
adoption ofNAFTA, not to improve environmental protection.106
As ofMarch 2000, non-governmental organizations (''NGOs''~
had filed twenty-three separate private enforcement submissions. lO
The Secretariat terminated six of these submissions on the grounds
that they did not fall within the category of claims permitted under
Article 14. The Secretariat terminated an additional two because the
issues contained within were the subject ofpending administrative or
judicial review.
The other fifteen submissions survived Article 14(1) and 14(2)
determinations. One of the fifteen was then voluntarily withdrawn.
The Secretariat was reviewing two of the fifteen to determine whether
responses from the Parties were warranted. Another was awaiting a
response from the Party. Seven more were awaiting the Secretariat's
105. A more skeptical view of the Agreement is that the United States had no intention of
procuring improvements in Mexico's environmental enforcement efforts at the time the
Agreement was conceived. Under this view, the Agreement was merely a ruse to
obtain Congressional approval for NAFTA.
Schiller, supra note 91, at 453.
When Clinton was touting the side-agreement as a milestone in transnational
environmental enforcement, a number of U.S. trade journals were quietly
explaining why the CEC would have little authority. A background paper
published by the conservative Heritage Foundation noted, "[t]he U.S.
negotiating team had to settle for a face-saving agreement that contained little or
no power ofenforcement. The side agreements are largely meaningless."
SIMON, supra note 60, at 227.
106. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
107. Commission on Environmental Cooperation Secretariat Submission Documents, in
NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, Winter 1998, at 65-138, available at
http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/publications/enforce_coop_law/naelp.cfm?varlan=
english (last visited Jan. 2, 2001) [hereinafter SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS]; Citizen Submissions
on Enforcement Matters: Registry and Public Files of Submissions, at
http://www.cec.org/citizen/ guides_registry/index.cfm? varlan=english (last visited Jan. 2,
2001) [hereinafter Registry].
418 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [39:395
determination regarding whether they warrant development of a
factual record.
In the remaining four cases, the Secretariat recommended
preparation of a factual record. The Council ordered that such a
record be prepared in two ofthe four cases. The Council has finalized
and adopted one of the factual records. Another was being prepared.
The remaining two were awaiting a decision from the Council. These
Article 14 submissions are summarized below.
A. Submission 95-001 on the U.S. Endangered Species Act
On June 30, 1995, the Biodiversity Legal Foundation, along
with four other NODs, including Mexico's Consejo Asesor Sierra
Madre, filed a submission against the United States. The Submitters
alleged that the enactment of the 1995 Rescissions Act resulted in a
failure to effectively enforce the Endangered Species Act ("ESA")
because the new law expressly prohibited the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service from listinf new endangered species under the Act during the1995 fiscal year. 10
The Secretariat noted that although the 1995 Rescissions Act
may have amounted to a breach of the obligation to maintain high
levels of environmental protection, this breach did not provide an
appropriate basis for an Article 14 submission, which must be based
on a "failure to effectively enforce" environmental laws.109 The
Secretariat held that the phrase "failure to effectively enforce"
referred only to action or inaction by agencies or agency officials, and
not to legislative decisions to limit or suspend enforcement. l1O
Accordingly, on December 11, 1995, the Secretariat terminated the
process, concluding that "Article 14 was not intended to create an
alternate forum for legislative debate."Ill
108. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 67, 69-71.
109. Id. at 72.
lID. Id. at 72-73.
1I1. Id. at 73.
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B. Submission 95-002 on the U.S. Salvage Logging Rider
On August 30, 1995, the Sierra Club, together with twenty-
seven other NGOs, filed a submission against the United States.112
The Submitters alleged that passage of the 1995 Salvage Logging
Rider (the "Rider") resulted in a failure to enforce all environmental
laws mentioned within, by eliminating private enforcement remedies
for salvage timber sales.113 Specifically, the Rider provided that
salvage timber sales would not be subject to administrative review
and would automatically satisfy all federal environmental and natural
resource laws.114 The Submitters asserted that the Rider's language
erected potentially "insurmountable obstacles to citizen enforcement
of these environmental laws"115 and essentially eliminated "the most
effective (and often only) judicial remedies for [such] violations."116
In a ruling similar to that in the previous submission, the
Secretariat held that "the enactment of legislation which specifically
alters the operation of pre-existing environmental laws in essence
becomes a part of the greater body of laws and statutes on the books.
This is true even if pre-existing law is not amended or
rescinded ...."117 The Secretariat concluded that the "deemed to
satisfy" language in the Rider did not constitute a "failure to enforce"
under Article 14 of NAAEC. Thus, the Secretariat terminated the
process on December 8, 1995.118
112. Id. at 77, 79. The other co-submitters were: Alaska Center for the Environment,
Ancient Forest Rescue, Friends of the Earth, Headwaters, Hells Canyon Preservation
Council, Idaho Conservation League, Inland Empire Public Lands Council, Institute for
Fisheries Resources, Klamath Forest Alliance, National Audubon Society, Natural Resources
Defense Council, Northcoast Environmental Center, Northwest Ecosystem Alliance, Oregon
Natural Resources Council, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations, Pacific
Rivers Council, Pilchuck Audubon Society, Portland Audubon Society, Seattle Audubon
Society, Southern Rockies Ecosystem Project, Western Ancient Forest Campaign, The
Wilderness Society, Earthlife Canada Foundation operating as BC Wild, Environmental
Resource Centre of Alberta, Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental, Grupo de Los Cien,
and Red Mexicana de Acci6n Frente al Libre Comercio. Id.
113. Id. at 77, 79-80.
114. Id. at 80.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 82.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 78,84-85.
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C. Submission 96-001 on Protection ofReefs in Cozumel,
Mexico
On January 18, 1996, the Centro Mexicano de Derecho
Ambiental (Mexican Center for Environmental Law) and two other
environmental organizations, the Comite para la Proteccion de los
Recursos Naturales (Natural Resource Protection Committee) and the
Grupo de los Cien Internacional (International Group of One
Hundred), filed a submission against Mexico.119 The submission
concerned the construction of a cruise ship pier on the island of
Cozumel, located in the Mexican State of Quintana Roo. The
Submitters alleged that the construction and operation of the cruise
ship pier would have a significant adverse environmental impact on
nearby coral reef ecosystems, of which the best known is the Paraiso
("Paradise") Reef. As such, the Submitters argued that, under
Mexico's national ecology law, work on the cruise ship pier m\lst be
halted until a proper environmental impact assessment· was
completed.120
I
The Secretariat determined that the Submitters had alleged a
sufficient factual and legal basis to require Mexico to respond.
Following a review of Mexico's response, the Secretariat
recommended that the Council order the preparation of a factual
record. 121 On August 2, 1996, the Council adopted the
recommendation and instructed the Secretariat to prepare a factual
record. 122
The factual record, which was completed and released to the
public on October 24, 1997, provided a detailed account of the
Mexican laws relating to the protection of Cozumel's reefs, and of
Mexico's apparent disregard of those laws in its effort to approve and
complete the Cozumel pier project.123 The factual record, however,
stopped short of expressly fmding that Mexico had violated the
NAAEC. It also failed to set forth any specific recommendations or
requirements for Mexico.124 As a result, there is considerable debate
and uncertainty as to the meaning of the fmdings and the significance
119. Id. at 87, 91.
120. Id. at 87-88,91-93.
121. Id. at 97.
122. Id. at 89.
123. Id. at 141-90.
124. Id. at 89.
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of the factual record.125 A more detailed analysis of the CEC's
response to the Cozumel reef dispute is provided below in Part VI.
D. Submission 96-002 on Wetlands Protection in Alberta,
Canada
On March 20, 1996, Mr. Aage Tottrup, a Canadian citizen,
filed a submission against Canada and the Canadian province of
Alberta, alleging that they had failed effectively to enforce water
pollution laws in wetland areas.126 Tottrup asserted that this non-
enforcement had resulted in si~ficant adverse impacts on the
habitats of fish and migratory birds.127
In considering whether the submission merited a response
from Canada or Alberta, the Secretariat reviewed Article 14(2) of the
NAAEC.128 Article 14(2) provides, in relevant part, that "in deciding
whether to request a response, the Secretariat shall be guided by
whether. . . private remedies available under the Party's law have
been pursued.,,129 The Secretariat pointed out that Mr. Tottrup had
already initiated proceedings against the Canadian federal
government in the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, Judicial
District of Edmonton, and that the outcome of that suit was still
pending.130 Accordingly, the Secretariat determined that, pursuant to
Article 14(2), it would not proceed any further with the submission
until the suit in the Court of Queen's Bench was resolved. 131
125. Susan Ferriss, Oversight Groups Coexist Uneasily with NAFTA Feeling Powerless,
Environmentalists Grow Frustrated, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 2, 1998, at A14. This
article contains a quote from Dora Uribe, an attorney from Cozumel, who states that the
"only conclusion [one] can make ... is that this is another bureaucracy with no power." Id.
Ms. Uribe's quote notwithstanding, Gustavo Alanis, Director of the Mexican Center for
Environmental Law, later declared that the Cozumel record represented "an enormous victory
for international environmental rights." Karen Brandon, A Vision Unfulfilled: NAFTA at 5,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 29, 1998, at 1.
126. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 99,101.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 101-02.
129. NAAEC, supra note 10, art. 14(2).
130. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 102.
131. Id.
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E. Submission 96-003 on Environmental Assessment ofFisheries
in Canada
On September 9, 1996, the Friends of the Oldman River
("FOR"), a Canadian organization, filed a submission against
Canada.132 FOR alleged that the Government of Canada was failing
to enforce the Canadian Fisheries Act ("CFA") and the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act ("CEAA"). Specifically, FOR stated
the following:
[t]here are very few prosecutions under the habitat
provisions of the Fisheries Act, and the prosecutions
that do occur are very unevenly distributed across the
country. In fact, there has been a de facto abdication
of legal responsibilities by the Government of Canada
to the inland provinces, and the provinces have not
done a good job of ensuring compliance with or
enforcing the Fisheries Act. 133
The Secretariat determined that FOR's submission satisfied
the criteria under Article 14(1) of the NAAEC, and requested a
response from Canada.134 In its response, Canada asserted that a
second environmental organization, Friends of the West Country
Association ("FWCA"), had filed suit in the Trial Division of the
Federal Court of Canada in Alberta on November 7, 1996-two
months after the filing date of the submission at issue. According to
Canada, the allegations contained in FOR's submission were
essentially the same as those raised in FWCA's lawsuit. As such,
Canada contended that the Secretariat was required to terminate the
review process until FWCA's case was resolved. 135
In evaluating Canada's response, the Secretariat began by
noting that, pursuant to Article 45(3) of the NAAEC, the term
"judicial or administrative proceeding" only refers to actions brou¥ht
by the Government, not by private parties such as FWCA. 36
132. ld. at 103, 109.
133. ld. at 103.
134. ld. at 109.
135. ld. Canada based its argument on Articles 14(2) and 14(3) of the NAAEC. As
discussed above in the summary ofMr. Aage Tottrup's submission, Article 14(2) provides, in
relevant part, that "in deciding whether to request a response, the Secretariat shaII be guided
by whether ... private remedies available under the Party's law have been pursued ...."
Article 14(3) provides that if"the matter is the subject ofa pending judicial or administrative
proceeding ... the Secretariat shaII proceed no further." NAAEC, supra note 10, art. 14(3).
136. NAAEC, supra note 10, art. 45(3). SpecificaIIy, Article 45(3) provides that
':iudicial or administrative proceeding" means:
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Accordingly, the Secretariat rejected Canada's argument that Article
14(3) mandated that the review process be tenninated. 137
Nonetheless, the Secretariat detennined that Article 14(2) did provide
discretionary authority to tenninate the review process in a case such
as this, even if an organization separate and distinct from a submitter
had filed the pending lawsuit.
The Secretariat concluded that the matters raised in the
submission bore a close resemblance to the issues then before the
Federal Court of Canada.138 As such, the Secretariat was "reluctant
to embark on a process which might unwittingly intrude on one or
more of the litigant's strategic considerations," a potential problem
which "weigh[s] in favor of allowing the domestic proceeding to
advance without risking duplication or interference by considering
parallel issues under the [NAAEC]."139 Accordingly, the Secretariat
tenninated the review process on April 2, 1997.140
F. Submission 96-004 on Military Base Expansion by the U.S.
Army
On November 14, 1996, the Southwest Center for Biological
Diversity ("SCBD"), a U.S.-based NGO, filed a submission against
the United States.141 The submission concerned the U.S. Army's
expansion of Fort Huachuca in the state of Arizona. SCBD alleged
that expanding the base would significantly increase demand for the
limited water resources of the San Pedro River basin, and increased
pumping from San Pedro River's aquifer would damage the unique
ecosystem that is dependent on the river's flow. 142 The Army
prepared an environmental impact assessment in connection with the
proposed base expansion, but it did not address "cumulative impacts,"
such as the effect of the expansion on regional water resources and
a domestic judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative action pursued by the Party
in a timely fashion and in accordance with its law. Such actions comprise:
mediation; arbitration, the process of issuing a license, permit or authorization;
seeking an assurance of voluntary compliance or a compliance agreement;
seeking sanctions or remedies in an administrative or judicial forum; and the
process of issuing an administrative order.
137. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 112.
138. Id. at 113.
139. Id. at 114.
140. Id. at 105, 114.
141. Id. at 66, 115.
142. Id. at 115.
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the San Pedro River basin ecosystem.143 SCBD contended that the
Army's failure to assess these cumulative impacts constituted a
failure to enforce and comply with the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA").144 Two years earlier SCBD had filed a lawsuit
against the Army alleging NEPA violations. However, a federal
judge had dismissed that lawsuit, holding that the statute of
limitations for SCBD's NEPA claim had expired. 145
The Secretariat determined that the submission satisfied the
criteria of Article 14(1) of the NAAEC and, therefore, requested a
response from the United States.146
The United States responded with several arguments. First,
the United States argued that the alleged non-enforcement of NEPA
occurred before the NAAEC entered into force and, thus, was not
subject to an Article 14 challen1f.e because the NAAEC was not
intended to apply retroactively. 47 Second, the United States
maintained that the Army's environmental imjact assessment was
consistent with the requirements of NEPA.14 Third, the United
States contended that SCBD had failed to pursue private remedies
under domestic law because the NEPA lawsuit had been untimely.149
Finally, the United States responded that the development of a factual
record by the CEC could adversely affect SCBD's pending judicial
appeal of the dismissal of a suit brought under the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA,,).150 According to the United States, the ESA
lawsuit was based on facts that were then the subject of its Article 14
submission.151
The Secretaliat did not address the arguments raised by the
United States because on June 6, 1997, SCBD filed a notice to
withdraw its submission, pursuant to Section 14.1 of the Guidelines




146. Id. at 117.





152. Id. at 117. Section 14.1 provides that "[i]f a Submitter infonns the Secretariat in
writing that it no longer wishes to have the submission process continue with respect to its
submission, the Secretariat will proceed no further with the submission ...." Article 14 and
15 Guidelines, supra note 99.
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Apparently, SCBD determined that its limited resources would be
better spent pursuing the domestic appeal rather than the submission.
As a result of SCBD's request, the Secretariat terminated the review
process in June 1997.
G. Submission 97-001 on Impact ofCanadian Hydroelectric
Dams on Fish in British Columbia
On April 2, 1997, the British Columbia Aboriginal Fisheries
Commission ("AFC"), a Canadian NGO, filed a submission against
the Government of Canada, alleging a failure to enforce the Canadian
Fisheries Act and the National Energy Board Act. 153 According to
the AFC, the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans ("DFO")
and the National Energy Board (''NEB'') had failed to protect the fish
and fish habitat in British Columbia's rivers from ongoing
environmental damage caused by hydroelectric dams. 154 Specifically,
the AFC alleged that the DFO had refused to impose fmes against
private hydropower companies for damage to fish habitat and that the
NEB had refused to investigate the environmental impacts of
hydropower generation.155
On May 15, 1997, the Secretariat determined that AFC's
submission satisfied the criteria of Article 14(2) and requested a
response from Canada.156
On July 21, 1997, Canada filed its response with the CEC.157
In its response, Canada argued that a factual record should not be
prepared for the following reasons: (1) the enforcement of the
Fisheries Act was the subject of pending judicial and administrative
proceedings; (2) the DFO's and NEB's actions were consistent with
the agencies' discretionary authority under Canadian environmental
law; and (3) the non-enforcement alleged by the AFC took place
before the NAAEC went into effect.15S
The Secretariat concluded" that Canada's arguments did not
warrant terminating the Article 14 review process because the
pending administrative and judicial proceedings did not deal with the
153. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 66, 119.
154. Id. at 119.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 121.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 120.
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same underlying facts, the DFO's and NEB's enforcement discretion
was not unlimited, and the alleged non-enforcement had continued
after the NAAEC took effect. Accordingly, the Secretariat
recommended that the Council order the preparation of a factual
record. On June 24, 1998, the Council adopted the recommendation
and instructed the Secretariat to prepare a draft factual record. 159
In conformity with the procedures for developing a factual
record, the CEC developed a timeline, which included deadlines for
the receipt of comments by interested stakeholders.160 The CEC
extended those deadlines several times, but eventually the Secretariat
received comments from the following sources: (1) the AFC; (2) the
government of Canada; (3) the government of British Columbia; (4)
B.C. Hydro; and (5) the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation.161 The
Secretariat is currently reviewing the information and "will conduct
the appropriate follow up.,,162 It is not known when the factual record
will be completed or whether the Council will authorize publication
ofthat record.
H. Submission 97-002 on Water Pollution in Sonora, Mexico
On March 15, 1997, the Comite Pro Limpieza del Rio
Magdalena ("CPLRM") filed a submission against Mexico. The
submission alleged that the municipalities of Imuris, Magdalena de
Kino, and Santa Ana, located in the Mexican State of Sonora
3
were
discharging untreated wastewater into the Magdalena River. 16 The
CPLRM maintained that these discharges violated the federal General
Ecology Law, as well as Sonora's Ecology Law and Sonora's Water
Law.1b4
On July 2, 1997, the Secretariat asked the CPLRM to provide
additional information regarding claims that Mexico and the State of
159. See Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-97-Q01.
160. See North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Draft Factual
Record Under Articles 14 and 15 SEM-97-001, Synopsis (Jan. 15, 1999),1 http://
www.cec.org/citizeniguidesJegistry/registrytext.cfin?&varlan=english&documentid=186
(last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
161. Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-97-Q01.
162. ld.
163. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 123.
164. ld. (citing Ley 217 del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y la Protecci6n al Ambiente para el
Estado de Sonora, Ley nfunero 38 de las aguas del Estado de Sonora, Ley numero 109 de
salud para el Estado de Sonora, and Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico yla Protecci6n al
Ambiente).
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Sonora had "failed to enforce" the above mentioned laws.165 On
October 6, 1997, the Secretariat determined that the submission
complied with Article 14(1) of the NAAEC.l66 Seven months later,
the Secretariat issued an Article 14(2) determination and requested a
response from Mexico.167
Mexico filed its response on July 29, 1998.168 Mexico argued
that most of the facts contained within the submission occurred prior
to the date the NAAEC came into force. According to Mexico, the
Secretariat could not legally consider such facts. Mexico also
contended that CPLRM failed to exhaust available legal remedies
prior to filing its submission. Mexico maintained that, in cooperation
with the State of Sonora, it was working to improve the state of the
Magdalena River despite budgetary constraints. In response to the
statutory violations alleged by CPLRM, Mexico asserted that it was
effectively enforcing its environmental laws.169
On December 16, 1999, the Secretariat re~uested additional
information from the Submitters under Article 21.1 The Secretariat
is still awaiting a response from CPLRM.
L Submission 97-003 on Pollution from Hog Farms in Quebec,
Canada
On April 9, 1997, the Centre Quebecois Du Droit de
L 'Environment ("CQDE") filed a submission against Canada and the
Province of Quebec alleging non-enforcement of Quebec's
Environmental Quality Act and Quebec's Regulation Respecting the
Prevention of Water Pollution in Livestock Operations. l71 Seventeen
other organizations, mostly from Quebec, joined the CQDE as co-
165. ld.
166. Letter from the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, to
Sr. Enrique Mantaiio Guzman, Sr. Jesus Alberto Sanchez S., and Ing. Luis Felipe Ayala S.,
Comite pro limpieza del Rio Magdalena (Oct. 6, 1997), http://www.cec.orglcitizenl
guides_registry/registrytext.cfin?&varlan=english&documentid=125 (last visited Jan. 2,
2001).
167. Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-97-Q02.
168. ld.




171. Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-97-Q03.
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submitters. l72 The Submitters alleged that the government of Quebec
had failed to enforce "certain environmental protection standards
regarding agricultural pollution ori~ating from animal production
facilities, mainly from hog farms."I?
On May 8, 1997, the Secretariat determined that the
submission complied with Article 14(1) of the NAAEC. On July 9,
1997, the Secretariat made an Article 14(2) determination and
requested that Canada file a response.
On September 9, 1997, Canada filed a response in which it set
forth two main arguments. 174 First, Canada asserted that Quebec was
effectively enforcing its Environmental Quality Act and the
Regulation Respecting the Prevention ofWater Pollution in Livestock
Operations.175 Second, Canada maintained that the preparation of a
factual record by the CEC would be inappropriate because Quebec
had 'just adopted new regulations with respect to agricultural
pollution and new measures to improve the enforcement of the
Environmental Quality Act.,,176 As such, even if there had been a
problem of non-enforcement in the past, Quebec had since taken
action to address the problem, and hence there was no current "failure
to enforce" and no basis for the Secretariat to proceed.
On October 29, 1999, the Secretariat recommended that the
Council order the preparation of a factual record. 177 The Council has
yet to adopt the Secretariat's recommendation.
J. Submission 97-004 on Canada's East Coast Fisheries
On May 26, 1997, the Canadian Environmental Defence Fund
("EDF") filed a submission against Canada, alleging that the
172. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 125. The CQDE's co-submitters were
Centre de Recherche et d'lntervention Environnementale du Grand-Portage, Comite de
Citoyens «Abon port », Comite de Citoyens de Grande-Piles, Comite de Citoyens de Saint-
Andre de Kamouraska, Comite de Citoyens de Sainte-Luce, Comite de Citoyens de St-Roch-
de-Mekinac, Comite de Citoyens de Shipton Propre, Comite de Protection de la Sante et de
l'Environnement de Gaspe, Comite de Protection Panmassawipi, Comite de Sante Publique
et de l'Environnement, Comite de Qualite de Vie de Saint-Jean-de-Dieu, Les Ami-e-s de la
Terre de Quebec, Mouvement Vert Mauricie, Re~oupement Ecologique de Val d'Or et de
ses Environs, Reseau Quebecois des Groupes Ecologistes, Union Quebecoise pour la
Conservation de la Nature, and Union Saint-Laurent Grands Lacs.
173. Id. at 126.
174. Id. at 127.
175. Id. at 126.
176. Id.
177. Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-97-Q03.
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Canadian government was not enforcing its laws "requiring
environmental assessment of federal initiatives, policies and
programs."178 Specifically, the EDF asserted that the Canadian
government violated the Environmental Assessment and Review
Process Guidelines Order ("EARPGO") when it approved and
implemented The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy ("TAGS") without
first performing an environmental assessment. 179 The EDF argued
that the implementation of TAGS without the assessment
''jeopardized the future of Canada's east coast fisheries."180
According to the EDF, at the time that TAGS was introduced in May
1994, EARPGO was the governing federal law for environmental
assessment. Therefore, TAGS was subject to EARPGO's
requirements, and Canada had no discretionary authority to avoid an
environmental assessment.181
In evaluating the EDF submission, the Secretariat looked to
the language in Article 14(1) of the NAAEC.182 The Secretariat
found significant the fact that the language in Article 14(1) only refers
to situations in which a party "is failing to effectively enforce its
environmentallaw."183 As such, the Secretariat concluded that the
Article 14(1) submission procedures are not available to private
parties alleging non-enforcement that occurred wholly in the past. In
the written determination on the matter, published on August 11,
1997, the Secretariat stated that:
[t]he submission refers to an action, inaction or
decision, which has already been completely acted
upon over three years ago, with nothing about the
decision left open or unfinished. The submission, filed
three years after the decision on, and the entry into
force of, the government's strategy, provides no
indication that the Party's failure is continuing or
recent. The Secretariat is not aware of any reason that
would have prevented the Submitter from filing its
submission at the time it became aware of the
government's alleged failure to enforce.184
178. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 129-30.
179. ld. at 132.
180. ld.
181. ld.
182. ld. at 133-34.
183. ld. at 134.
184. ld.
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The Secretariat also concluded that "[uJnder the
circumstances, the submission does not appear to have raised the
issue of non-enforcement in a timely manner in light of the temporal
requirement of Article 14(1)."185 Accordingl~, the Secretariat
terminated the review process on August 25, 1997. 86
The Secretariat's determination in this matter thus appears to
establish two new requirements for Article 14 submissions that seem
somewhat akin to the common law concepts of mootness187 and
laches.I88 First, an Article 14(1) submission cannot solely allege a
past failure to enforce environmental law; rather, it must allege an
ongoing and present failure to enforce environmental law. Second, if
a submitter does not file a submission in a "timely manner" (a phrase
not defined in the CEC's determination), the submission may be
deemed inconsistent with the "temporal requirements" (also not
defmed) ofArticle 14(1).
K. Submission 97-005 on the Biodiversity Convention Under
Canadian Law
On July 21, 1997, three Canadian organizations, the Animal
Alliance of Canada, the Council of Canadians, and Greenpeace of
Canada, filed a submission against the government of Canada.189 The
Submitters alleged that Canada had failed to enforce its regulation
ratifying the Convention on Biolofjcal Diversity signed at the Rio
Earth Summit on June 11, 1992, 90 and subsequently ratified by
Canada pursuant to an Order-in-Council on December 4, 1992.191
According to the Submitters, pursuant to the Order-in-Council, the
Convention on Biological Diversity ("Biodiversity Convention") is
now a legally binding regulation under Canadian law.192 Specifically,
185. ld.
186. ld. at 130.
187. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 697 (abr. 6th ed. 1991) (stating that "an action is
considered 'moot' when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because issues
involved have become academic or dead").
188. See id. at 606 (stating that the '''[d]octrine of laches' is based upon maxim that
equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. It is defined as neglect to
assert a right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances
causing prejudice to the adverse party, operates as bar in court ofequity").
189. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 137.
190. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 52.
191. Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-97-Q05.
192. ld.
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the Submitters asserted that Canada had failed to enforce Article 8(k)
of the Biodiversity Convention, which requires that each country must
"[d]evelop or maintain necessary legislation and/or other regulatory
provisions for the protection of threatened species and
populations."193 This submission represented the first time the
Article 14 process was used to seek enforcement of an international
environmental treaty.
On May 26, 1998, the Secretariat issued the Article 14(1)
determination.194 The Secretariat began by addressing the issue of
whether the Ratification Instrument constituted "environmental law"
for purposes of the NAAEC.195 The Secretariat acknowledged that
the term "environmental law" should be interpreted expansively.196
Nonetheless, the Secretariat found that the Submitters failed to make
"a critical distinction between 'international' and 'domestic' legal
obligations.,,197 Based on Canada's "long-standing constitutional
principle ... that the ratification process does not import international
obligations into domestic law" absent implementation by way of
statute and/or regulation, the Secretariat concluded that the
Ratification Instrument could not be considered an "environmental
law" of Canada for purposes of Article 14(1).198 Instead, "[t]he
Ratification Instrument simply evidence[d] and constitute[d] a one-
time administrative act by a representative of the executive branch of
the Canadian govemment.,,199 Holding that any further review of the
submission at issue was tPcrecluded, the Secretariat terminated the
process on May 26, 1998.2 0
A question left unanswered by the Secretariat's determination
is whether an NGO that was not an original submitter may be added
as a co-submitter after the Secretariat has begun the review process.
In this case, two NGOs, the Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental
and the Northwest Ecosystem Alliance, requested that the Secretariat
add them as co-submitters four and five months, respectively, after
193. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 52, art. 8(k).
194. Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Detennination
Pursuant to Article 14(1) ofthe North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&
documentid=156 (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
195. ld.
196. ld.
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the submission had been filed.201 The Secretariat responded to both
parties that neither the NAAEC nor The Guidelines for Submissions
on Enforcement Matters Under Articles 14 and 15 contemplated the
addition of co-submitters. While the Secretariat indicated that the
requests would be evaluated, the Registry of Submission on
enforcement Matters does not indicate that such an evaluation ever
took place. The requests became moot when the Secretariat
terminated the process.
L. Submission on Environmental Assessment ofFisheries in
Canada202
On October 4, 1997, The Friends of the Oldman River
("FOR"), a non-profit society incorporated under Canadian law,
began anew the Article 14 process on its previous submission.20.3 Six
months earlier, the Secretariat had determined that FOR's submission
did not warrant developing a factual record because legal issues
similar to those raised in the submission were pending befote the
Federal Court ofCanada.204 That case, brought by The Friends of the
West Country Association ("FWCA") against the Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans and the Attorney General of Canada, was
apparently dismissed in September of 1997.205 FOR stated that
FWCA had abandoned its application based on information it
received post filing.206
201. Letter from the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, to
Mr. Gustavo Alanis Ortega, President, Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental (Dec. 19,
1997), http://www.cec.org/citizenlguidesJegistrylregistrytext.cfin?&varlan=english&docu
mentid=128 (last visited Jan. 2, 2001); Letter from the Secretariat of the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, to Mr. Mitch Friedman, Northwest Ecosystem Alliance (Dec.
19, 1997), http://www.cec.org/citizenlguidesJegistry/registrytext.cfin?&varIan=english&
documentid=129 (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
202. See supra Part V.E and accompanying notes.
203. Letter from Martha Kostuch, Vice President, The Friends of the Oldman River, to
Victor Lichtinger, Executive Director, Commission for Environmental Cooperation (Oct. 4,
1997), http://www.cec.org/citizenlguidesJegistrylregistrytext.cfin?&varlan=english&docu
mentid=145 (last visited Jan. 2, 2001) [hereinafter FOR Re-Submission Letter].
204. Id.; see also Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation,
Determination Pursuant to Articles 14 & 15 of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (Apr. 2, 1997), http://www.cec.org/citizenlguidesJegistry/
registrytext.cfin?&varlan=english&documentid=73 (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
205. FOR Re-Submission Letter, supra note 203.
206. The information indicated that of the 21 stream crossings contemplated by the
project-in-question, 19 had never been the subject of authorizations or letters of advice and
the remaining two would undergo an environmental assessment pursuant to the Navigable
Waters Protection Act. Id.
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On May 8, 1998, the Secretariat requested a response to
FOR's submission from the Government ofCanada.207
Canada submitted its response on July 13, 1998.208 Canada
maintained that the matter continued to be the su~ect of active
litigation because appeals could still be considered.2o Canada also
argued that it was effectively enforcing its environmental laws and
that the method by which it enforced Section 35 of the Fisheries Act
and its implementing Directives was "a legitimate exercise of its
regulatory and compliance discretion.,,210 Canada further noted that
the offending Directive "operates within the law and possesses
administrative integrity."211 Canada stated that the pattern of
program implementation and enforcement across the country was
appropriate and that cooperation with provinces increased
enforcement resources and allowed for more effective
enforcement.212
On July 19, 1999, the Secretariat recommended that the
Council order the preparation of a factual record.213 The Council has
not yet voted on whether to adopt the Secretariat's
recommendation.214
M Submission 97-007 on the Hydrological Basin ofthe Lerma
Santiago River, Lake Chapala, Mexico
On October 10, 1997, the Instituto de Derecho Ambiental (the
Institute for Environmental Law) ("IDA") filed a submission against
the Government of Mexico, alleging that authorities had failed to
properly handle an administrative citizen complaint by the IDA.215
207. See the Article 14(2) Determination of the CEC Secretariat, dated May 8, 1998,
http://www.cec.orglcitizen/guidesJegistry/registrytext.cfin?&varlan=english&documentid=1
53 (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
208. Response of the Government of Canada to Submission on Enforcement Matters
Under Articles 14 and 15 ofthe North American Agreement on Environmental Co-Operation
(NAAEC), Submission No. SEM-97-006, Oct. 4, 1997, by Friends ofthe Old Man (sic) River,
http://www.cec.orglcitizen/guides_registrylregistrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&





213. Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-97-Q06.
214. Id.
215. Id. at SEM-97-Q07.
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The IDA filed the complaint, which sought a declaration of a state of
emer~ency in the Lake Chapala ecosystem, on September 23,
1996. 16 According to the IDA, the Procuraduria Federal de
Proteccion al Ambiente (the Federal Attorney for Environmental
Protection or "PROFEPA") failed to follow the procedure required by
the General Law on Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection
("LGEEPA") with respect to the IDA's complaint.217
On October 2, 1998, the Secretariat requested a response from
Mexico.218 Mexico filed its response on December 16, 1998.219
Mexico responded that it had processed the citizen complaint at issue
in accordance with the LGEEPA.220 Mexico also took the position
that the function of the complaint is merely to inform an
environmental authority of potential issues that might be investigated
by that authority.221 Mexico further asserted that the IDA's petition
was not properly before the Secretariat because the IDA had failed to
exhaust its recourse under Mexican law.222 In addition, the IDA
failed to state how the government's alleged omissions affected or
endangered the environment.223 Mexico contended that the IDA's
submission dealt purely with procedure and not the environmental
state of Lake Chapala, which was the focus of the citizens'
complaint.224 The Secretariat is still reviewing the submission in
light of the response provided by Mexico.225
N. Submission 98-001 on Explosions in the Reforma Sector of
the City ofGuadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico
On January 9, 1998, the IDA, together with some of the
citizens affected by a series of explosions in Guadalajara, Mexico on
April 2, 1992, filed a submission alleging that the Federal Attorney
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. The Secretariat's Determination under Article 14(2) is not available for public
viewing.
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General and the Federal Judiciary failed to duly enforce the LGEEPA
in relation to the explosions.226 The explosions, which occurred as a
result of the presence of hydrocarbons and other highly explosive
substances in the underground sewer, killed 204 people, injured 1460
others, and destroyed or damaged roughly 1100 buildings.227 The
Federal Attorney initiated criminal proceedings against nine
individuals, but subsequently stayed those proceedings-an act that
the IDA believed effectively impeded any further investigation of the
incident.228
On September 13, 1999, the Secretariat rejected the initial
submission in part because it failed to connect the incident with a
violation of environmental law.229 The Secretariat found that the
dismissal of the criminal proceedings did not constitute a failure to
enforce environmental law.230 The Secretariat granted the IDA thirty
days to file a new submission that would meet the criteria of Article
14(1).231 The IDA resubmitted its petition on October 15, 1999.232
The Secretariat reached the same conclusion regarding the second
submission and terminated the process on January 11,2000.233
Although the submission was ineffective, the Secretariat
reached two conclusions worth noting. The first is temporal. The
Secretariat began by noting that the explosions at issue had occurred
in 1992, nearly two years prior to the NAAEC's effective date of
January 1, 1994.234 The Secretariat then reasoned that the NAAEC
does not require that events referenced by a submitter in its
allegations must have occurred after the NAAEC entered into force,
226. Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Determination
Pursuant to Article 14(1) ofthe North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(Sept. 13, 1999), http://www.cec.orglfiles/english/03-14E.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001)
[hereinafter Art. 14(1) Determination for Submission 98-001].
227. Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-97-o07.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. Interestingly, the Secretariat did not reach the issue of whether the dismissal
constituted a failure to enforce against the nine defendants, nor whether failing to prosecute
others constituted afailure to enforce. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Letter from the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, to
the Instituto de Derecho Ambiental (Jan. 11, 2000), http://www.cec.orgifiles/espanoll06-
R14_l.PDF (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
234. Art. 14(1) Determination for Submission 98-001, supra note 226, at 5-6.
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so long as the allegedfailure to e1':,0rce environmental law occurred
after the NAAEC's effective date.2 5
The second conclusion relates to the application of certain
NAAEC provisions. In its submission, the IDA alleged that Articles
5(1)6)(1), 6, and 7 of the NAAEC had not been enforced
effectively.236 The Secretariat pointed out, however, that Article 14
of the NAAEC provides the exclusive process for NGOs and
individuals alleging that a party is not effectively enforcing its
environmental laws.237 Thus, NGOs and individuals cannot seek
enforcement of Articles 5(1)6)(1), 6, and 7 v.ia a submission under
Article 14.238
O. Submission 98-002 on Forestry Operations in El Taray,
Jalisco, Mexico
On October 14, 1997, Hector Gregorio Ortiz Martinez filed a
submission against the Secretaria de Medio Ambiente, Recursos
Naturales y Pesca (the Secretary of Environment, Natural Resources
and Fisheries or "SEMARNAP") and the PROFEPA, alleging various
procedural violations in processes relating to forestry operations in EI
Taray.239 This submission, like the previous one, found its origin in
the filing of a denuncia popular (a citizen complaint).240 As such,
Martinez's submission dealt largely with the Party's internal
administrative proceedings and not the enforcement of environmental
law.241 The Secretariat found that there were several grounds on
which to reject Martinez's submission, including the fact that
Martinez's complaint centered around the management of commercial
natural resources-a subject that, under Article 45(2)(b) of the
NAAEC, is excluded from the definition of "environmentallaw."242
235. Id. at 6.
236. Id. at 2.
237. Id. at 7.
238. Id.
239. Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-98-Q02.
240. Id.; Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Determination
in Accordance with Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (Oct. 14, 1998), http://www.cec.org/citizeniguidesJegistry/registrytext.cfin?
&varlan=english&documentid=165 (last visited Jan. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Submission 98-
002 Determination].
241. Submission 98-002 Determination, supra note 240.
242. Id.
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The Secretariat concluded that the submission failed to meet the
requirements established in Article 14(1).243
Having so determined, the Secretariat was not required to
reach the Submitter's remaining allegations.244 Nonetheless, the
Secretariat believed it necessary to address "a type of allegation
which in [the Secretariat's] opinion ... is not within [its] jurisdiction
nor contemplated by the objectives listed in Article 1 ofNAAEC.,,245
The submission at issue contained accusations against various
government officials in different agencies and at different levels of
government.246 According to the Secretariat, such accusations are
inappropriate because the process established by the NAAEC in
Article 14 was not intended to serve as a mechanism to review the
performance of individual public officials.247 Rather, the process
solely addresses the actions of the authorities as institutions.248
Mr. Martinez resubmitted his petition on August 4, 1998, to
no avai1.249 The Secretariat issued a final determination and
terminated the process on March 18, 1999.250
P. Submission 98-003 on Solid Waste and Medical Waste
Incinerator Air Pollution and the Great Lakes
On May 27, 1998, the Department of the Planet Earth,
together with eight other NGOs, filed a submission against the United
States.251 The Submitters alleged that certain EPA regulations and
programs to control airborne emissions of dioxin, mercury and other
toxic substances from solid waste and medical waste incinerators
violated and failed to enforce various domestic laws and treaties with







249. Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-98-D02.
250. ld.
251. ld. at SEM-98-D03. The other NGOs were: Sierra Club of Canada; Friends of the
Earth; Washington Toxics Coalition; National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides;
WASHPIRG; International Inst. of Concern for Public Health; Dr. J. Cummins, Genetics, U.
ofWestern Ontario; and Reach for Unbleached. ld. .
252. NGO Petition to the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation
for an Investigation and Creation of a Factual Record, http://www.cec.orglcitizenJ
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elimination of persistent toxic substances" and "zero emission"
standards contained in the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
between Canada and the United States.253 According to the
Submitters, the regulations also violated provisions of the Clean Air
Act.254
On December 14, 1998, the Secretariat determined that the
issues raised in the submission could not be reviewed under the
Article 14 process because the Parties' conduct did not qualify as
"enforcement."255 The Secretariat determined that enforcement does
not include government standard-setting because the NAAEC's
purpose is not to set environmental standards for the Parties.256 The
Secretariat found support for this determination in Article 3, which
recognizes the right of each Party to establish its own levels of
domestic environmental protection.257 Article 5 also supports the
determination because it contains an illustrative list of government
actions that constitute enforcement activity.258 When viewed as a
whole, the list is geared toward promoting compliance with such
standards.259 Article 14 focuses on whether, once established, such
standards are effectively enforced.260
The Secretariat's determination includes a discussion ofwhere
the line should be drawn between standard setting and enforcement in
the context of a Party's promulgation of re~lations that establish
substantive emission or discharge standards.261 Ultimately, the
Secretariat concluded that the issues in the submission merely
represented an inconsistency in ~oveming legal standards-an issue
beyond the scope ofArticle 14.26




255. Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Determination
Pursuant to Article 14(1) ofthe North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(Dec. 14, 1998), http://www.cec.org/citizen/guidesJegistrylregistrytext.cfin?&varIan=
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On January 14, 1999, the Submitters amended their
petition.263 The thrust of their argument was that the International
Joint Committee ("DC") had "taken the point of view that 'standard-
setting' approaches for persistent toxic substances are inappropriate
and unworkable."264 The Submitters maintained that although end-
of-the-pipe emission controls and best available technologies for such
controls are standard-setting methods, none of the alternative
programs contemplated by their submission involved standard-
setting.265 Accordingly, they argued that the CEC should not be
precluded from considering their submission.
In its second Article 14(1) and 14(2) determination, the
Secretariat reminded the Submitters that both Article 45(2) and the
Secretariat's previous determination in the Animal Alliance
submission (97-005) dictated against a fmding that the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement, or any other similar agreement, is
"environmental law" for purposes of NAAEC.266 An international
obligation must be imported into domestic law b1' way of statute or
regulation before the Secretariat may consider it.26
The Secretariat ultimately determined, however, that two of
the Submitters' three issues warranted a response from the United
States. First, the Submitters' assertion that the United States was
failing to adequately inspect and monitor incinerator emissions
warranted a response because "maintaining an adequate
inspection/compliance-monitoring scheme is an inherent part of
enforcement.,,2b8 Second, the Submitters' allegation that the United
States was failing to enforce a section of the Clean Air Act that
required the EPA Administrator to notify state governors in certain
instances warranted a response from the United States.269 The
Secretariat was not convinced, however, that the Submitters' assertion
that the EPA had failed to follow a legislatively-charted path
263. Amended NGO Petition to the North American Commission for Environmental
Cooperation for an Investigation and Creation ofa Factual Record Under Articles 14 and 15
(Jan. 4, 1999), http://www.cec.orglcitizen/guides_registrylregistrytext.cfin?&varlan=english
&documentid=201 (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Determination
Pursuant to Article 14(1) and 14(2) of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (Sept. 8, 1999), http://www.cec.orglcitizen/guidesJegistry/registrytext.cfin?&
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constituted "enforcement" under the NAAEC.270 Accordingly, the
Secretariat requested that United States respond only to the first two
issues.
In its voluminous response, the United States asserted that the
Submitters' allegation concerning EPA's inspection and monitoring
activities did not meet the NAAEC's requirements because the
Submitters failed to: (1) identify which law the United States was
failing to enforce; (2) give the United States an opportunity to
respond to the allegations; and (3) pursue available domestic
remedies.271 The United States also asserted that the Submitters'
allegation concerninBSection 115 of the Clean Air Act misstates thelaw's requirements.2 2 In each instance the United States contended
that it was effectively enforcing its environmentallaws.273
The Secretariat is currently reviewing the Submission in light
of the U.S. res~onse to determine whether it warrants developing a
factual record.2 4
Q. Submission 98-004 on the Impact ofthe Mining Industry on
Fisheries in British Columbia
On June 29, 1998, the SIerra Legal Defense Fund, on behalf of
the Sierra Club of British Columbia, the Environmental Mining
Council of British Columbia and the Taku Wilderness Association,
filed a submission against the government of Canada.275 The
Submitters alleged that the Canadian government had systematically
failed to enforce a law that protects fish and fish habitat from the
environmental impacts of the mining industry in British Columbia.276
270. Id.
271. Response of the United States ofAmerica to Submission on Enforcement Matters
98-003 Made by the Department ofthe Planet Earth, Inc., et aI. under Article 14 of the North





275. Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-98-o04.
276. The Sierra Club ofBritish Columbia et aI., The Government ofCanada's Failure to
Enforce the Fisheries Act Against Mining Companies in British Columbia, June 29, 1998,
http://www.cec.orgicitizeniguidesJegistry/registrytext.cfin?&varlan=english&documentid=
157 Oast visited Jan. 2, 2001).
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On November 30, 1998, the Secretariat deemed the
submission to have satisfied Article 14(1).277 Seven months later, the
Secretariat determined that the submission merited a response from
the Canadian government.278
Canada filed its response on September 8, 1999.279 Canada
contended that it was effectively enforcing its environmental laws and
was in full compliance with its NAAEC obligations.28o Canada also
alleged that: (1) the assertions in the submission were the subject of
pending administrative proceedings; (2) the Submitters failed to
provide Canada with a reasonable opportunity to respond to the
claims raised in the submission; (3) the Submitters were attempting to
apply the NAAEC retroactively; and (4) the Submitters failed to
pursue private remedies.281
The Secretariat is currently reviewing the submission in light
of Canada's re~onse to determine whether it warrants developing a
factual record.2
R. Submission 98-005 on Hazardous Waste Landfills in
Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico
On July 23, 1998, Domingo Gutierrez Mendivil, President of
the Academia Sonorense de Derechos Humanos, A.C., filed a
submission against the government of Mexico.283 The Submitter
alleged that Mexico, through its authorization of the operation of a
hazardous waste landfill less than six kilometers away from
Hermosillo, had failed to effectively enforce Mexico's environmental
laws.284 Specifically, Official Mexican Standard NOM-CPR-
277. Letter from the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, to
Mr. David R. Boyd, Sierra Legal Defense Fund (Nov. 30, 1998),
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guidesJegistry/registrytext.cfin?&varlan=english&documentid=
182 (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
278. See the CEC Secretariat determination under Article 14(2) of the NAAEC, dated
June 25, 1999, http://www.cec.org/citizen/guidesJegistry/registrytext.cfin?&varlan=english
&documentid=212 (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
279. Response of the Government of Canada to a Submission on Enforcement Matters
Under Articles 14 and 15 ofthe North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(Sept. 8, 1999), http://www.cec.org/citizen/guidesJegistry/registrytext.cfin?&varlan=english
&documentid=213 (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
280. ld.
281. ld.
282. Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-98-Q04.
283. ld. at SEM-98-Q05.
284. ld.
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004ECOLl1993 set the appropriate distance at a minimum of twenty-
five kilometers.285 .
The Submitter alleged that the authorities intended to close the
current landfill and build a new one within the territory of Sonora.286
Moreover, the Submitter asserted that the authorities would simply
abandon the CUlTent landfill without addressing potential
contamination issues.287 Finally, the Submitter contended that the
SEMARNAP, the State of Sonora, and the Municipality of
Hermosillo were denying the public an opportunity to comment on
the location of the new landfill in violation of the LGEEPA.288
The Secretariat requested a response from Mexico on April 9,
1999.289 Mexico filed its res~onse, part of which it designated as
confidential, on July 12, 1999. 90 In its response, Mexico countered
that the Submitter failed to exhaust all available legal remedies before
filing his submission.291 Mexico also asserted that the allegations in
the submission were the subject of pending judicial or administrative
action.292 Mexico maintained that the environmental laws at issue did
not apply to the offending landfill, which predated those laws.293
Assuming that they did apply, however, Mexico argued that the
minimum distance of twenty-five kilometers was not an absolute
requirement.294 Mexico took the position that remediation at the
current landfill was "not congruent with the purpose of a landfill as a
site for the fmal disposal ofwastes."295 Finally, Mexico stated that it
had not yet determined the location of the new site.296
The Secretariat is currently reviewing the submission in light
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S. Submission 98-006 on Shrimp Farms in Isla del Conde,
Municipality ofSan Blas, Nayarit, Mexico
On October 20, 1998, the Grupo Ecol6gico Manglar, A.C.
filed a submission alleging that Mexico was "failing to effectively
enforce its environmental laws with respect to the establishment and
operation of' Granjas Aquanova S.A., a shrimp farm in Isla del
Conde.298 Specifically, Mexican authorities failed to enforce
provisions (1) protecting jungles and tropical rainforests, (2)
regulating waste water discharge, (3) preventing and controlling water
pollution and use, and (4) relating to fisheries and the introduction of
non-native species.299 The Submitter further alleged that Mexican
authorities failed to prosecute Granjas for its environmental
offenses-possibly forcing the Secretariat to address an issue left
open in the determination in submission 98-001.300 In addition, the
Submitter asserted that Mexico failed to follow up on administrative
procedures contained within an agreement between authorities and
Granjas to access damages and remediation measures.30l Lastly, the
Submitter contended that Mexico failed to protect migratory species
and wetlands as mandated by three international conventions.302
On March 17, 1999, the Secretariat made the requisite Article
14(1) and 14(2) determinations and requested a response from
Mexico.303 Mexico filed its response on June 15, 1999.304 In its
response, Mexico argued that the Submitter failed to exhaust all
available legal remedies.305 Mexico reiterated that a citizen
complaint is not a remedy and, at any rate, Mexico had not yet
completed its review of the one filed by the Submitter.306 Mexico
maintained that it was effectively enforcing its environmental laws
and that some of the provisions invoked by the submitter were not
applicable because they were not in effect at the time of Granjas'
298. Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-98--Q06.
299. Id.
300. Id.; see also Part V.N, supra, discussing submission 98--Q01.
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offenses.307 Mexico also argued that the Submitter failed to cite the
precise treaty provisions with which Mexico had failed to comply.308
As of February 2000, the Secretariat was still reviewing the
submission in light of Mexico's res~onse to determine whether it
warrants developing a factual record.3 9
T. Submission 98-007 on an Abandoned Lead Smelter in
Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico
On October 23, 1998, the Environmental Health Coalition,
together with the Comite Ciudadano Pro Restauracion del Canon del
Padre y Servicios Comunitarios, A.C., filed a submission against
Mexico, alleging that the government failed to enforce its
environmental laws with respect to an abandoned lead smelter in
Tijuana.310 Specifically, the Submitters stated that Metales y
Derivados, a subsidiary of New Frontier Trading Corporation, failed
to repatriate to the United States the hazardous waste that it generated
in Tijuana.311 Instead, the owners and operators abandoned their
company and left behind approximately 6000 metric tons of lead slag,
by-product waste piles, sulfuric acid, and heavy metals from battery
recycling operations.312 The Submitters asserted that Mexico had
failed to enforce its environmental laws through its failure to
criminally prosecute the owner and its lack of efforts to contain or
neutralize the hazardous waste.313
On March 5, 1999, the Secretariat issued determinations under
Articles 14(1) and 14(2) and requested a response from Mexico.314
Mexico filed its response, but designated it as confidential.315
Although Mexico is encouraged by Guideline 17.3 to provide the




310. Petition Before the Commissionfor Environmental Cooperation, Under Articles 13,
14 and 15 ofthe North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (Oct. 21, 1998),
http://www.cec.orglcitizen/guides_registry/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=




314. Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-98-Q07.
315. Id.
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of confidentiality, it does not appear that Mexico has done so. The
Secretariat is currently reviewing the submission in light of Mexico's
confidential resQonse to determine whether it warrants preparation of
a factual record.316 , .
U. Submission 99-001 on Underground Storage Tanks in the
State ofCalifornia
On October 18, 1999, the Methanex Corporation, a Canadian
methanol manufacturer incorporated under the laws of the province of
Alberta, filed a submission against the State of California and the
United States.317 Methanex alleged that the state and federal
governments failed to enforce California's environmental laws and
regulations relating to underground storage tanks ("USTs") and water
resource protection.318 Methanex acknowledged, however, that not
all USTs are regulated.319 Methanex asserted that California had
failed to properly enforce its environmental laws related to
environmental and water resource protection through its failure to
regulate all USTs.320 Methanex's submission relied largely on a
report issued by the California State Auditor on December 17,
1998.321 The report heavily criticized state officials for failing to
adequately protect California groundwater and address contamination
from leaking storage tanks.322 .
The Secretariat is currently reviewing the submission to
determine whether it meets Article 14(1) criteria.323 It bears noting
that Methanex's submission is the first to focus solely on a state's
failure to effectively enforce its environmental laws. Although
Methanex included allegations of Clean Air Act and Safe Drinking
Water Act violations, and generally referenced the federal
government several times, Methanex's submission focused on
316. ld.
317. ld. at SEM-99-001.
318. See page 1 of the submission, dated October 18, 1999, which can be found at
http://www.cec.orglcitizenlguides_registry/registrytext.cfi:n?&varlan=english&documentid=




322. ld. at 1-2.
323. ld.
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California.324 This raises the question of whether a submission must
specifically allege an independent failure to effectively enforce
environmental law by a federal government that is one of the three
NAAEC signatories.
V. Submission 99-002 on Migratory Birds in the United States
On November 11, 1999, the Alliance for the Wild Rockies,
together with eight other NGOs from Canada, Mexico, and the United
States, filed a submission against the United States alleging that the
government is failing to effectively enforce Section 703 of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA'~, which prohibits the killing of
migratory birds without a permit.3 5 Specifically, the Submitters
alleged that the United States has refused to enforce Section 703 as it
relates to loggers, logging companies, and logging contractors.326
According to the Submitters, the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"),
the agency obligated to enforce the MBTA, has a "longstanding,
unwritten policy relative to the MBTA that no enforcement or
investigative action should be taken in incidents involving logging
operations that results in the taking of non-endangered,· non-
threatened, migratory birds and/or their nests."327 The Submitters
contended that the relevant statutes and regulations do not
contemplate such an exemption.328
The Secretariat made the requisite determinations under
Article 14(1) and 14(2), and re9.uested a response from the United
States on December 23, 1999.329 At this time, the Secretariat is still
awaiting the U.S. response.
324. Id. For instance, the submission does not indicate which provisions of the Clean
Air Act or the Safe Drinking Water Act the United States is failing to effectively enforce, nor
does it contain any specific allegations against the United States.
325. Registry, supra note 107, at SEM-99-Q02. The other eight NGOs are: the Center
for International Environmental Law; the Centro de Derecho Ambiental del Noreste de
Mexico; the Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental; the Friends of the Earth; the Instituto
de Derecho Ambiental; the Pacific Environment and Resources Center; the Sierra Club of
Canada; and the West Coast Environmental Law Association.
326. Submission to the Commission on Environmental Cooperation Pursuant to Article
14 ofthe North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, at 4 (Nov. 19; 1999),
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guidesJegistry/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=
220 (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Secretariat of the Commission on Environmental Cooperation, Determination
Pursuant to Article 14(1) and 14(2) of the North American Agreement on Environmental
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w: Submission DO-DOlan Air Pollution in Cumpas, Sonora,
Mexico
Rosa Maria Escalante de Fernandez filed the first submission
of the year 2000 in February.330 She alleges that the government of
Mexico has failed to effectively enforce the LGEEPA and certain
Official Mexican Standards for environmental health in relation to air
pollution from the Molymex, S.A. de C.V. plant in Campus.331 The
Molymex plant produces molybdenum trioxide from molybdenum
sulfide.332 The Submitter asserts that pollution emitted by the plant
causes "irreversible and irreparable damage to the residents' health
and the environment by increasing mortality rates and affecting crops
in Campus.,,333
The Secretariat is reviewing the submission to determine
whether it meets the criteria ofArticle 14(1).334
VI. THE COZUMEL REEF CASE: THE LIMITS OF THE 1993 NORTH
AMERICAN REGIME
As discussed above, as of March 2000, only one Article 14
submission had resulted in the publication of a factual record by the
CEC-the submission involving damage to coral reefs in Cozumel,
Mexico ("Cozumel Reef Case").335 All of the other Article 14
submissions were terminated or withdrawn, or were being reviewed
and processed by the CEC.
In the submissions that were terminated, the CEC set forth
several important interpretations of the NAAEC. Among other
things, the submissions terminated by the CEC appear to establish the
following nine conditions on the availability of Article 14 procedures
to private parties: (1) Article 14 does not apply to legislation that
suspends or prevents enforcement of environmental laws;336 (2)
Cooperation, at 1 (Dec. 23, 1999), http://www.cec.orglcitizen/guides_registry/registrytext.
cfin?&varlan=english&documentid=222 (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).





335. See supra notes 107, 121-25 and accompanying text.
336. See the discussion of Submissions 95-001 and 95-002, supra notes 110-11, 117-
18 and accompanying text.
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Article 14 does not apply to legislation that alters or weakens the
operation of pre-existing environmentallaws;337 (3) Article 14 does
not cover matters that are currently the subject of a pending
administrative challenge or lawsuit, even if the administrative
challenge or lawsuit was :filed b~ someone other than the party that
filed the Article 14 submission;3 8 (4) Article 14 submissions cannot
allege a past failure to enforce environmental law, but rather must
allege an ongoing and present failure to enforce environmental
law;339 (5) Article 14 submissions may be terminated if they are not
filed in a timely manner;340 (6) Article 14 does not apply to violations
of international environmental treaties unless such treaties were
enacted as domestic law;341 (7) Article 14 does not apply to the
development of natural resources;342 (8) Article 14 cannot be used to
reconcile inconsistencies between governing domestic environmental
standards;343 and (9) Article 14 does not cover violations of Articles
5,6, and 7 of the NAAEC.344
An assessment of the CEC's interpretation ofArticle 14 of the
NAAEC will be provided in the following part, which evaluates the
present role of North American environmental law in the context of
the 1993 North American Regime. Before turning to this larger
question, however, this Article will first undertake a more detailed
examination of the Cozumel Reef Case, the first dispute to work its
way fully through the Article 14 process. The Cozumel Reef Case is
significant in that it represents the CEC's fullest flexing of its
enforcement muscle to date. As such, the case serves to illustrate
both the potential, and the limitations, of North American
environmental law as it is set forth in the 1993 North American
Regime.
337. See the discussion of Submission 95-002, supra notes 117-18 and accompanying
text.
338. See the discussion of Submissions 96-002 and 96-003, supra notes 130-31, 136-
40 and accompanying text.
339. See the discussion of Submission 97-004, supra notes 178-88 and accompanying
text.
340. Id.
341. See the discussion of Submission 97-005, supra notes 197-200, 266-67 and
accompanying text.
342. See the discussion of Submission 98-002, supra notes 242-43 and accompanying
text.
343. See the discussion of Submission 98-003, supra notes 255-62 and accompanying
text.
344. See the discussion of Submission 98-001, supra notes 237-38 and accompanying
text.
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An examination of the Cozumel Reef Case raises several
questions. Has the NAAEC been legally enforced? If the NAAEC
has not been legally enforced, is this due to the political timidity of
the CEC, or to the weak substantive provisions of the NAAEC itself?
Is the NAAEC framework flexible enough to evolve politically, so
that over time the agreement's aspirational provisions could
eventually be treated as binding and enforceable? Does the NAAEC
need to be substantively revised to increase the enforcement authority
of the CEC? Should North American environmentalists seek to limit
the extension of the 1993 North American Regime as a model for
international negotiations with other Central and South American
nations? These questions should be kept in mind during the
discussion below.
A. The Reefs ofCozumel
Coral reefs represent one of the world's most fragile and
endangered ecosystems. The reefs are formed by colonies of tiny
single-celled animals that secrete calcium carbonate to form a hard
outer skeleton.345 New colonies grow on the skeletons of dead corals
in a process that builds vast reef structures over thousands of years.346
In this temporal sense, coral reefs can be compared with the ancient
forests found on land, in that the timeframe for their development is
often measured in centuries and millenniums.347 Craig Quirolo, of
the Key West-based group Reef Relief, stated in a 1994 position
paper on the Cozumel situation that "[t]he coral reef ecosystem is the
most diverse marine habitat in the world, and harbors a bounty of life,
color and motion that is rivaled only by the tropical rainforests."348
The Island of Cozumel is located south of the Yucatan
Peninsula in the state of Quintana Roo in Mexico, about 40 miles, or
18 kilometers, offshore from the city of Cancun.349 The waters off
the southwest coast of Cozumel are a large coral reef zone. This zone
contains (north to south) Paraiso Reef, Dzulha Reef, Chan-Kanaab
345. Amanda Marx, TED Case Studies-Pier Construction and Coral (May 4, 1997),
http://gurukul.ucc.american.edutrED/COZUMEL.HTM (last visited Jan. 2, 2001)
[hereinafter Marx Report].
346. ld. at 8-9.
347. ld.
348. Open Letter from Craig Quirol0, Reef Relief2 (Oct. 20, 1994) (on file with author)
[hereinafter ReefReliefPosition Paper].
349. Nancy Nusser, Pier in Cozumel Clashes with Concern over Coral, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, March 17, 1996, at 12A.
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Reef, Yucab Reef, Tunich Reef, San Francisco Reef, Santa Rosa
Reef, Cedral Reef, Palancar Reef, Colombia Reef, Chunchacab Reef,
and Maracaibo Reef.35o The coral reefs off Cozumel's southwest
coast-"a wall of exploding colors and bizarre formations perched on
top of a sea trench dropping 3,000 feet,,351-are considered among
the most spectacular and biologically diverse in the world.352
For this reason, Cozumel's reefs have become a mecca for
marine biologists and scuba divers alike. Cozumel's reefs ftrst began
to receive broad attention in the 1970s, after the release of several
underwater documentaries by Jacques Cousteau,353 the most famous
of which was Sleeping Sharks ofthe Yucatan. Today, there are over
70 independent dive operators on the island354 and, in a 1996 article,
the Washington Post reported that some scuba diving magazines rate
Cozumel's reefs second in popularity only to Australia's Great
Barrier Reef.355 One of the most well-mown of Cozumel's reefs is
Paraiso (or "Paradise") Reef, which is home to spotted eels, toadftsh,
lobsters, Atlantic octopus, crabs, ftleftsh, angels, and other nocturnal
ftsh.356
Recognizing that its coral reefs are one of the primary reasons
people visit the island, Cozumel has so far adopted a much different
tourism strategy than nearby Cancun. Instead of the luxury hotels,
mega-resorts, and souvenir shopping malls one ftnds in Cancun,
Cozumel has chosen to cater to the more outdoorsy, diver types that
come to explore the nearby reefs.357 To date, the focus of Cozumel's
tourism development has been on preserving the small-scale relaxed
atmosphere and the pristine natural environment, so that the island
remains an international destination spot for scuba divers and others
350. SECRETARIAT OF THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION,: FINAL
FACTUAL RECORD OF THE CRUISE SHIP PIER PROJECT IN COZUMEL, QUlNTANA Roo 55 (1997),
http://www.cec.orglpubs_info_resources/publications/mandate...pubs/cozindex.cfin?varlan=
english Oast visited Feb. 15,2001) (providing a map ofthe Cozumel Island ReefZone).
351. SIMON, supra note 60, at 197.
352. See ReefReliefPosition Paper, supra note 348, at 2. For additional information on
the biological diversity ofCozumel's reefs, see Douglas Fenner, Leeward Reefs and Coral of
Cozumel, Mexico, 42 BULL. OF MARINE SCI. I, 133-34 (1988).
353. Molly Moore, Divers and Cruise Ships Battle over Cozumel's Coral Reefs, WASH,
POST, May 25, 1996, at A01.
354. Hayes Ferguson, Paradise May Be Lost with Cruise Ship Pier-NAFTA Queries
Mexico's Actions, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 26, 1996, at AI.
355. Moore, supra note 353, at A01.
356. Marx Report, supra note 345.
357. Moore, supra note 353, at AOl.
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interested in experiencing nature undisturbed.358 Cozumel's strategy
has, in many ways, been a response to the experience of other
Mexican resorts, such as Acapulco and Cancun, where large-scale
development resulted in the destruction of surrounding forests and
coastal dunes, degradation of scenic beaches, and increased water
pollution.359 The Cozumel strategy also sought to tap into growing
international tourist demand for destinations unspoiled by
"Acapulcoization" an apt term coined by author and journalist Joel
Simon.360 As Simon observes in his 1997 book Endangered Mexico:
An Environment on the Edge, "[b]y the 1980s a specialized but
growing section of the [tourism] market began demanding less luxury
and more authenticity."361 Simon notes that "[b]ecause it is used to
thinking big, Mexico has had a hard time adapting to the new trends
in travel such as nature tourism and adventure tourism, the fastest-
growing segment of the market.,,362 In Mexico, Cozumel was one of
the few places to capitalize on this expanding ecotourism market.
The unique ecology of Cozumel's reefs and the tourism
industry dependent on these reefs have also prompted some action by
the government of Mexico. In 1980, Mexico created the Cozumel
Marine Refuge,363 and in 1996, Mexico's President Ernest ZediHo
created a Cozumel national marine park.364 The marine refuge and
national marine park, which include the island's southwest reefs, were
created in response to domestic and international concerns about
development expanding south from the city of San Miguel de
Cozumel, located just north of the reef zone. The marine refuge and
the national marine park, although supported by environmentalists,
marine biolo~sts and private diving operators, is more symbolic than
substantive.3 5 This is because, under Mexican law, the marine
358. Paving of Mexican Reef Tests NAFTA's Environmental Clout, ARIz. REpUBLIC,
May 18,1996, atA20.
359. Bob Shacochis, In Deepest Gringolandia, HARPER'S, July 1989; see also FERNANDO
MARTI, CANCUN: AFANTASY OF BANKERS (1990).
360. SIMON, supra note 60, at 199.
361. Id. at 188.
362. Id. at 195.
363. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 87-88 (citing "Zona de Refugio para la
Flora yFauna Marinas de la Costa Occidental della Isla Cozumel, Estado de Quintana Roo
(Protection Zone for the Marine Fauna and Flora of the Western Coast of the Island of
Cozumel in the State ofQuintana Roo)," D.O., June 11, 1980).
364. Aviva Freudmann, NAFTA Agency Probes Cozumel Port Project, J. OF COM., Aug.
5, 1996, at 5A.
365. See ALEXANDER STONE, PARAISO: A LIVING REEF AT RiSK: HABITAT SURVEY &
ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT, PARAISO REEF, COZUMEL, at 3 (1995) [hereinafter PARAISO
ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT].
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refuge and national marine park designations do not prohibit the
development of projects with adverse environmental impacts on the
reefs.366
B. The Consorcio Pier Project
With the goal of increasing tourism to the island, in the late
1980s, the Mexican government began negotiating with Consorcio H
("Consorcio"), a Mexico-based companr& regarding the construction
of a new cruise ship pier on Cozumel. 7 The new pier was to be
located near the port city of San Miguel de Cozumel. The Mexican
government and Consorcio offered several reasons for building and
operating a new pier at this location. First, there was a preexisting
customs pier located near San Miguel de Cozumel and the City had
developed infrastructure and facilities to service it. The customs pier
began accepting cruise ships in the late 1970s.368 Second, as the
largest city on the island, the shops, restaurants, and hotels in San
Miguel de Cozumel were in a position to benefit from the tourist~ that
would arrive at the new pier. Consorcio's plans included the
development of a u.S. $230 million complex of hotels, resorts,
restaurants, shops, and a golf course in the area surrounding the new
pier.369 The expanded complex was referred to as the "Puerta Maya
Project.,,370 Consorcio estimated that the Puerto Maya Project would
create 3,600 new jobs on Cozume1.371
Notwithstanding the reasons offered by the Mexican
government and Consorcio, there was widespread concern, both in
Cozumel and elsewhere, about the impacts of the proposed pier. Part
of this concern focused on the path of development that the proposed
pier represented. The development plans put forth by the Mexican
government and Consorcio seemed to be based on the Acapulco and
366. The decision to "designate the area of the Cozumel reef a national marine park ...
has mislead many observers to conclude a park would limit commercial development of the
area, said John Garrison, a legal consultant to the Mexican Environmental Law Center. 'It's
a big misconception that a park would stop development ... [h]ere you can build in a natural
protected area.'" [d.
367. Marx Report, supra note 345.
368. Ferguson, supra note 354, at AI.
369. SIMON, supra note 60, at 197; see also Marx Report, supra note 345 ("Current
project plans include the construction of a terminal building for passengers, pier terminal
access, parking facilities, a golf course, a shopping center, and a Club Resort. The esti1Jlated
cost for the tourist complex is $230 million."). Id.
370. Tim Duffy, Coalition Wants Cozumel Pier Stopped, NEWS, Oct. 31, 1997.
371. Ferguson, supra note 354, at AI.
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Cancun model, a model that Cozumel had so far resisted.372 Much of
the concern, however, related to the specific location that had been
selected for the proposed pier. Although the coastal waters north of
San Miguel de Cozumel do not contain coral reefs,373 the plan was to
build the Consorcio pier south of the city, within the northern
boundary of the Cozumel Marine Refuge and a mere 150 meters from
the ridge of Paraiso Reef.374 The main reason for selecting this site
was its close proximity to the preexisting pier, which was located near
the southern end of the city. Environmentalists, diving operators, and
marine biologists believed that the construction and operation of the
cruise ship pier at this particular site would seriously damage Paraiso
Reef, as well as other coral reefs in the Cozumel Marine Refuge.375
These critics also maintained that the area north of San MiFel de
Cozumel provided a suitable alternative location for the pier.37
The plans for the Consorcio pier called for the construction of
two separate sections. The first section would extend out 260 meters
perpendicular from the shore. The second section, containing the
actual ship docks, would extend out 324 meters at a 45-degree angle
from the pier's first section.377 Construction of the pier called for it
to be supported by ninety-four concrete pillions, which would be
erected on a base layer of gravel rocks. Each of the ninety-four
pillions would be set in place by a barge crane using four-point
anchor positioning.378
In terms of operation, the Consorcio pier was designed to
accommodate cruise ships up to 320 meters in len~h and 12 meters in
draft (the hull's extension down into the water). 79 The sea bottom
depth at the site of the cruise ship docks is only 15 meters in depth.
This left a mere 3 meters between hull bottoms and the sea floor.380
The preexisting pier did not provide tugs to assist ships in docking,
372. Reef Relief Position Paper, supra note 348, at 1-2 ("Yet, as it seems now, short-
tenn tourism investment has again prevailed over long-tenn growth based on a healthy
marine environment. . .. [I]t is a dangerous practice to exploit the natural resource upon
which tourism depends to near exhaustion. And the construction ofyet another cruise ship in
Cozumel is simply one more step along this precarious path. We urge you to plan
development with generations in mind, not simply fiscal years....").
373. Marx Report, supra note 345.
374. PARAISO ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT, supra note 365, at 9.
375. Id. at 2-3; Marx Report, supra note 345.
376. Nusser, supra note 349; Marx Report, supra note 345.
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and all ships that docked there were required to do so under their own
propeller power.381 It was expected that ships at the Consorcio pier
would also dock under their own power.382
After the specifics of the construction and operation plans for
the Consorcio pier were revealed, the plans came under attack from
environmentalists, diving operators, and marine biologists. In 1994,
Ree:fKeeper funded an environmental impact assessment of the
proposed project to help focus public and scientific attention on its
environmental impacts. Ree:fKeeper is a private international
organization with offices in Florida, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and
Mexico. Ree:fKee~er works with more than 300 local groups to
protect coral reefs. 83 In January of 1995, Ree:fKeeper published a
forty-page report entitled Paraiso: A Living Reef at Risk: Habitat
Survey & Environmental Assessment ("Paraiso Environmental
Assessment,,).384 The Paraiso Environmental Assessment involved
several prominent coral reef experts, including Dr. Pamela Hallock-
Muller of the University of South Florida's Marine Science
Department, Dr. Douglas Fenner of Coral Clay Conservation, and Dr.
Stephen Cofer-Shabica, Oceanographer with the U.S. National
Biological Survey.385
The Paraiso Environmental Assessment contained an analysis
of the potential impacts of the proposed construction and operation of
the Consorcio pier on the Paraiso Reef, as well as other reefs in the
Cozumel Marine Refuge. Dr. Hallock-Muller indicated that
environmental damage would not be restricted just to Paraiso Reef,
because "in aquatic systems the need for buffer zones is particularly
acute, since pollutants and sediments are readily carried from
unprotected areas into protected areas."386 Dr. Fenner expressed
grave concerns about the impacts resulting from operation of the pier,
particularly the foreseeability of damage from trailing anchors and
anchor chains. Dr. Fenner warned that "[t]he effects of the anchor
chain of just one cruise ship anchored on the south side of Grand




383. Id. at inside front cover.
384. See generally PARAISO ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT, supra note 365.
385. Id. at l.
386. Id. at 85.
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Dr. Stephen Cofer-Shabica offered the most severe and
comprehensive critique in the Paraiso Environmental Assessment.
According to Dr. Cofer-Shabica, the impacts of the construction
phase "would include the direct burial of corals and other livebottom
from gravel, the smothering of corals and other livebottom by silt and
sediments suspended during pier construction, and the potential
grounding of vessels and subsequent crushing of livebottom and
coral.,,38lf In terms of pier operation, Dr. Cofer-Shabica found that
the following impacts would likely occur:
prop-wash scour [barren sea bottom caused by
churning of underwater propellers] from cruise ships,
burial of coral and livebottom by siltation from
suspended sediments, shading of the bottom due to
decreased water clarity, chronic siltation and the
consequences of this sub-lethal impact on the growth
and survivorship of hard and soft corals, accidental
groundings and anchor damage, and the potential for
decreased water quality from oil spills, cruise ship
effluents, and physical shading of the bottom by ship
hulls.389
Based on these findings, the ReefKeeper's Paraiso
Environmental Assessment reached the following determination:
Particularly taking into account that these reef areas lie
within the boundaries of the Cozumel Marine Refuge,
and that the Refuge's purpose is to protect marine flora
and fauna, it must be considered that the proposed site
for the Consorcio H Pier is unacceptably close to
viable, functional and valuable coral communities that
would be placed at unacceptable risk from pier
construction and operation.390
In response to the criticisms from environmentalists, divers,
and marine biologists, in 1995, a referendum was held to determine
whether the citizens of Cozumel supported or opposed the Consorcio
pier project. In this referendum sixty percent of the citizens of
Cozumel voted against the project.391 The results of this referendum
led the Governor of the state of Quintana Roo, Mario Villanueva
388. Id. at 82.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 31.
391. See Ferguson, supra note 354, at AI.
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Madrid, to declare his opposition to the project as well.392 This local
and state opposition did not prevent the Consorcio project from
moving forward, however, because the Mexican government was
handling the permits for the project.393
C. Environmental Assessment Required by the Mexican
Government
In 1988, the federal government of Mexico adopted the
General Law ofEcological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection
("Federal Ecology Law").394 This law is similar to the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") in the United States.395 Under
Article 28 of Mexico's Federal Ecology Law, an environmental
impact statement ("EIS") must be prepared before construction or site
modification potentially affecting the environment is undertaken.396
Enforcement and implementation of the Federal Ecology Law are the
joint responsibility of the Secretariat for Urban Development and
Ecology ("SEDUE") and the National Institute for Ecology
("INE").397 ,
In 1988, Mexico also adopted Regulations on Impact
Assessment ("RIA") to clarify the legal obligations of the government
and private parties under the Federal Ecology Law.398 Article 10 of
the RIA sets forth the minimum information that an EIS must contain
with respect to description of a project. Under Article 10, an EIS
must include a
description of the work or planned activity, starting
with the selection of the site for the work and the
development of the activity; the surface area required;
the construction project; the erection and operation of
the installations to be developed; the type of activity;
392. See Marx Report, supra note 345.
393. Id.
394. Ley General del Equilibrio Ecologico y la Protecci6n al Ambiente, D.O., Jan. 28,
1988 [hereinafter Federal Ecology Law].
395. For discussion ofNEPA, see supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
396. Federal Ecology Law, supra note 394, art. 28.
397. See Anne Rowley, Mexico's Legal System ofEnvironmental Protection, 24 ENVTL.
L. REp. 10,431, 10,422, 10,434, 10,433 (1994); Hector Herrera, Mexican Environmental
Legal Framework, 2SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 31, 33-34 (1994).
398. See Regulamento de la Ley General del Equilibrio Ecologico y la Protecci6n at
Ambiente en Materia de Impacto Ambiental, in SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at
144, 148, 151 & 159.
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the anticipated volume of production; necessary
investments; the type and quantity of natural resources
to be developed at the construction stage and during
the performance of the work or development of the
activity; a waste management program, both during the
construction and installations phases as well as during
the operation or development of the activity; and a
program for abandoning the works or ceasing
activity.399
The RIA also contains directives aimed at "Related Projects"
and "Future Growth Policies." The RIA directive on "Related
Projects" requires that the project proponent must "explain if other
projects will be required in the development of the work or
activity."400 The RIA directive on "Future Growth Policies" requires
that the project proponent must explain "the strategy to be adopted by
the company, indicating the extensions, future works, or activities that
are planned for the area.,,401
In September 1989, the Mexican Port Authority ("Pumex"), an
agency of the Mexican federal government, published new guidelines
entitled Concessions for Piers for Tourist Cruise Ships and
Specialized Cargo Terminals ("Pumex Guidelines").402 The Pumex
Guidelines defmed "tourist cruise ship piers" to include "land areas
designated for construction and installations necessary to attend to the
cruise ship passengers and for locating services to ensure their
comfort" and "parking areas for public and private vehicles used to
transport passengers.,,403 Pursuant to the new Pumex Guidelines, in
November of 1989, Consorcio submitted a proposal for the
construction and operation of a new pier in Cozumel. Consorcio
submitted its proposal to the Secretariat of Communication and
Transportation ("SCT"), a federal Mexican agency.404 In October
1990, in addition to its pier concession proposal, Consorcio submitted
a document entitled General Environmental Impact Statement for the
Construction of Cruise Ship Pier in Cozumel, Quintana Roo
("Consorcio EIS,,).405
399. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 159.
400. ld. at 160.
401. ld.
402. ld.
403. ld. at 160-61 (emphasis added).
404. ld. at 194.
405. ld. at 161.
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The Consorcio EIS defined the proposed "project" as the pier,
but omitted mention of any adjacent on-shore facilities.406 There
were no discussions in the document of parking facilities, land-based
terminals, or any other commercial developments, such as hotels,
restaurants, or shops.407 The "Related Projects" section of the
Consorcio EIS stated that the plan was "to reorganize the service
presently offered to vessels by modifying the terminal installations
currently operated by the Port Services of Cozumel, including
relocating the Ferry Terminal and the related services necessary to
attend to tourists' needs efficiently."408 No additional information
was provided about the modification or relocation of installations or
services. The "Future Growth Policies" section of the EIS estimated
that by 2010, eight vessels per day would arrive in Cozumel. The
implication was that four of those vessels would be without pier space
and would have to be serviced by tenders. The EIS further stated that
such a condition would be an "inconvenience for elderly tourists, who
may be unwilling to disembark without flxed installations. It is
estimated that part of this traffic could be channeled toward
installations to be developed on the mainland.,,409 No additional
information was provided about the scope or location of these
mainland installations.
The scope of the Consorcio EIS was thus limited to the
proposed pier. The Consorcio EIS found that construction and
operation of the pier would result in damage to three percent of the
Paraiso Reef, but it proposed mitigation provisions for the removal
and relocation of these threatened reef portions prior to the initiation
ofpier construction.410 As such, the Consorcio EIS indicated that the
adverse environmental impacts of the project would be fairly
minimal, and that appropriate preliminary measures would be taken to
avoid, or at least mitigate, these impacts. The fmdings of the
Consorcio EIS were reinforced by a report released by the National
Institute of Ecology ("INE").411 The INE report determined that
Paraiso Reef was "biologically dead," therefore suggesting that there
was nothing that could be biologically damaged by the construction or
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conflict with the findings of Mexico's other environmental agency,
SEDUE. In April of 1990, SEDUE had issued a report in which the
agency stated that the proposed Consorcio pier would be "situated
within the Protected Natural Coral ReefArea ofCozumel and fwould]
have negative impacts on various threatened coral species."4 3 As a
result, SEDUE "recommended that the project not be authorized."414
Notwithstanding SEDUE's previous fmdings, the INE approved the
Consorcio pier proposal in December 1990. The INE's approval was
subject to certain environmental conditions, including the removal
and relocation of certain portions ofParaiso Reef.415
More than two years after the INE approved the pier project,
Consorcio requested the SCT's approval for a project to develop a
land-based terminal adjacent to the pier.416 The SCT granted
Consorcio a concession for the construction, operation, and
development of a public port terminal, and declared that this new
project would be performed subject to the environmental
authorization issued by SEDUE in 1990.417 In this concession, the
SCT also promised to "contribute" 430,352 square meters of federal
land for "real estate tourist development" adjacent to the Consorcio
pier.418 In August 1994, the INE endorsed the SCT's position and
informed Consorcio that work on the terminal project could proceed
so long as the work was carried out in compliance with the conditions
of the 1990 EIS.419 No new EIS was required for the land-based
terminal project, or for the donation of federal land (for real estate
tourist development).
In November of 1994, the Government of Quintana Roo
requested in writing that the INE reconsider its authorization with
regard to the proposed site for the construction of the Pier.42o In its
request, the Government of Quintana Roo stated that, after conducting
its own inspection of the area in which construction was planned, the
state had determined that "Paraiso Coral Reef would be seriously
dama§ed by both construction activity and the operation of the
Pier." 21 In February 1995, the INE responded to the Government's
413. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 194.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 155, 195.
416. Id. at 196.
417. Id. at 197.
418. Id. at 194.
419. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 198.
420. Id. at 198.
421. Id. at 199.
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written request. The INE stated that "due to a lack of arguments
showing the existence of supervening environmental impacts not
foreseen during the project evaluation procedure, [the INE] lacks
technical and legal grounds for any reconsideration of the [1990]
resolution."422
In April 1995, the Committee for the Protection of Natural
Resources ("CPNR"), an environmental organization based in
Mexico, filed an administrative public complaint (denuncia popular)
with the Federal Attorney's Office for Environmental Protection
("PROFEPA,,).423 The CPNR filed an administrative complaint
because non-governmental organizations do not have standing to sue
the government under Mexican law unless the,t can demonstrate
direct injury resulting from the alleged violation. 24 "Direct injury"
has been interpreted very narrowly by the Mexican cooos.425 The
CPNR alleged that the INE had failed to enforce the environmental
conditions set forth in its 1990 resolution approving the pier project.
Most of CPNR's allegations concerned Consorcio's failure to
properly remove and relocate the portions of Paraiso Reef that would
be damaged by the pier construction and operation. PROFEPA did
not undertake any enforcement actions in response to the
administrative public complaint filed by CPNR.426
D. The Submission
The three environmental organizations filed their Article 14
submission with the CEC on January 18, 1996. The primary
allegation in the submission concerned violations of Article 28 of the
Federal Ecology Law and the implementing RIA. According to the
Submitters, the Consorcio pier in Cozumel formed an indivisible part
of a larger-scale project, which included a passenger terminal
building, a means ofaccess from the terminal to the cruise ship pier, a
parking lot, and a public access road leading to the Chan-Kanaab
highway.427 The Submitters alleged that Consorcio knew the full
scope of this project in 1990. They alleged that the government knew
422. Id.
423. Id. at 200.
424. See Rowley, supra note 397, at 10,435; Schiller, supra note 91, at 465-67.
425. See Schiller, supra note 91, at 465-67.
426. See SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 201 (citing Document PFPA-D.E-
PSQ-032/95 (July 3, 1995)).
427. Id. at 147.
2001] THE PAPER TIGER AWAKENS 461
the scope no later than 1993, when Consorcio applied to the SCT for
approval of the pier terminal project.428 The Submitters further
asserted that the port terminal project was related to an adjacent real
estate tourist development project (the "Puerto Maya Project"), which
was also implicitly approved in the terminal ~roject concession
through the donation of federal land to Consorcio.4 9
According to the Submitters, "the Environmental Impact
Statement presented by [Consorcio] in August 1990 was incomplete,
and should have taken account of the projects directly related to the
work or proposed activity, in order to evaluate the cumulative
environmental impact that these projects together will have."43o The
Submitters also alleged that Mexican authorities had "failed to
effectively apply" Article 13 of the RIA, which required that the
Consorcio EIS evaluate the adjacent land-use impacts of operation of
the proposed off-shore pier.431
The Submitters maintained that the above actions undercut
"the purpose of the environmental impact evaluation procedure by
creating uncertainty with respect to the subject matter of the
evaluation (Le., allowing any proponent to present 'partial' reports
with respect to a single project)"'B2 and "prevent[ed] an adequate
evaluation of the environmental impacts produced by the project."433
The Submitters concluded, therefore, that the government of Mexico
was "failing to enforce environmental law effectively by authorizing
the construction of the pier (which represent[ed] only part of the
entire project) without evaluating as a whole the construction and
operation ofall the works that constitute the Port TerminaL,,434
E. Mexico's Response
In its response, Mexico objected to the Article 14 submission
on a number of grounds, both procedural and substantive. The
purpose of Mexico's response was to persuade the CEC that the
preparation of a factual record in the Cozumel Reef Case was either
428. Id.
429. Id. at 149.
430. Id.
431. Id. at lSD-51.
432. Id. at 148.
433. Id. at 149.
434. Id. at 148.
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expressly prohibited by the NAAEC provisions, or was not warranted
in this particular instance.
Procedurally, Mexico presented three main arguments. First,
Mexico asserted that all of the incidents of alleged non-enforcement
occurred .Brior to January 1, 1994, the date the NAAEC became
effective. 5 Article 14(1) ofNAAEC limits the scope of the CEC's
inquiry to allegations that a party "is failing to effectively enforce its
environmental laws,"436 and therefore prohibits retroactive
application of NAAEC to incidents that took place before the, treaty
was in force. The Article 14 submissions on Military Base Expansion
by the UNITED STATES Army437 and Canada's East Coast
Fisheries438 provided some support for Mexico's argument.
Although the submission on Military Base Expansion by the United
States Army was withdrawn by the submitter before the CEC issued a
determination, the United States had argued in its response that the
alleged non-enforcement was not subject to an Article 14 challen~e
because it had taken place before the NAAEC entered into force. 9
In its determination on Canada's East Coast Fisheries, the CEC
terminated the review process because it found that the submission
"provided no indication that the Party's failure [was] continuing or
recent."440
Mexico's second procedural argument concerned the standing
of the Submitters. According to Mexico, the Submitters had not
suffered any direct injury as a result of the alleged failure to enforce
the EIS provisions of the Federal Ecology Law.441 As already
discussed, under Mexican law, citizens and organizations cannot sue
the government unless they can demonstrate direct injury-a term
that has been interpreted very narrowly by the Mexican courts.
Article 6(2) of the NAAEC states that each nation "shall ensure that
persons with a legally recognized interest under its law in a particular
matter have appropriate access to administrative, quasi-judicial or
judicial proceedings for the enforcement of the Party's environmental
laws and regulations."442 Article 6(2), when read alongside Article
14, could be interpreted to mean that only those persons with a legally
435. ld. at 93, 151.
436. NAAEC, supra note 10, art. 14(1).
437. See supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
439. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
440. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
441. See SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 89, 93.
442. NAAEC, supra note 10, art. 6(2).
2001] THE PAPER TIGER AWAKENS 463
recognized interest under Mexico's laws have standing to file a
submission with the CEC.443
In its third procedural argument, Mexico argued that the
Submitters had failed to exhaust all remedies available under Mexican
law because they did not file suit in the Mexican courts.444 Article
14(3) requires that, before requesting the preparation of a factual
record, the CEC must consider "whether private remedies in
connection with the matter are available to the person or organization
making the submission and whether they have been pursued."445 This
argument was in many ways inconsistent with and contrary to
Mexico's position on the issue of standing, in which Mexico alleged
that the Submitters lacked a recognizable legal interest under Mexican
law.446 Under Mexico's reasoning, even though the Submitters
lacked the standing to file a suit under Mexican law, Article 14(3)
nonetheless required them to bring such a suit before filing a
submission with the CEC.
Substantively, Mexico offered two primary arguments. First,
Mexico alleged that Consorcio pier and the port terminal project were
not subject to the EIS requirements of Article 28 of the Federal
Ecology Law because the language of Article 28 refers only to "those
works or activities which utilize animals, forest resources, aquifers or
the subsurface as necessary raw materials, or which propose to
directly extract such resources."447 Under Mexico's interpretation of
Article 28, the consequential damage to coral reefs, or to fish that
depend on coral reefs, is insufficient by itself to trigger the EIS
requirements of the Federal Ecology Law.448
Second, Mexico disagreed with the Submitters' position that
the pier and terminal were indivisible parts of one larger project, and
that the donation of federal land in the 1993 concession amounted to
approval of the larger Puerta Maya Project. In terms of the
connection between the pier and the terminal, Mexico maintained that
the on-shore facilities represented distinct projects that did not need to
be evaluated in conjunction with the pier's construction.449 In terms
of the adjacent Puerta Maya Project, Mexico responded that "there
443. Schiller, supra note 91, at 466.
444. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 89, 93.
445. NAAEC, supra note 10, art. 14(3)(b)(ii).
446. See supra notes 441-43 and accompanying text.
447. Federal Ecology Law, supra note 394, art. 28.
448. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 94, 154.
449. Id. at 153.
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[was] no real estate development as suggested by the Submitters, and
that the onshore works referred to by the Submitters constitute[d] only
complementa~ elements of the pier described in the 1993
Concession.,,4 0 As such, the donation of federal land in the 1993
Concession was for the pier-related terminal project, not for a new,
unspecified real estate development.
F. The Secretariat's Determination
In its determination on the submission and Mexico's response,
the Secretariat was not required to find that the allegations in the
submission were true, nor was the Secretariat required to find that
Mexico was in fact failing to effectively enforce its environmental
laws. Rather, under the provisions of the NAAEC, the Secretariat
was only required to answer two, more limited questions. First, the
Secretariat had to determine whether the submission satisfied all of
the procedural requirements of Article 14(1).451 Second, the
Secretariat had to determine if, in light of the facts alleged and the
response ffovided, the submission "warrant[ed] developing a factual
record.,,4 In the Cozumel Reef Case, and for the first time since the
NAAEC went into effect, the Secretariat answered both of these
questions in the affmnative.
Procedurally, in regards to Mexico's retroactive application
argument, the CEC found that "events or acts concluded prior to
January 1, 1994 may create conditions or situations which give rise to
current enforcement obligations. It follows that certain aspects of
these conditions or situations may be relevant when considering an
allegation of a present, continuing failure to enforce environmental
law.,,453 In reviewing Mexico's argument concerning standing and
direct injury, the Secretariat noted "the importance and character of
the resource in question-a portion of the magnificent Paradise coral
reef"454 The Secretariat concluded that while "the submitters may
not have alleged the particularized, individual harm required to
acquire legal standing to bring suit in some civil proceedings in North
America, the especially public nature of marine resources [brought]
the submitters within the spirit and intent of Article 14 of the
450. Id. at 154-55.
451. See NAAEC, supra note 10, art. 14(1).
452. Id. art. 15(1).
453. SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 94.
454. Id. at 95-96.
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NAAEC.,,455 On the requirement of exhaustion of remedies, the
Secretariat concluded that "under the circumstances the submitters
attempted to pursue local remedies, primarily by availing themselves
of the 'denuncia popular' administrative procedure."456
Substantively, the CEC did not respond to each of the specific
arguments presented by Mexico. Instead, the CEC simply determined
that "despite the complexity of the issues raised in the submission, the
further study ofthis matter would substantially promote the objectives
of the NAAEC.,,457 It therefore recommended that the Council
authorize the preparation of a factual record.458 On Aupst 2, 1996,
the Council adopted the Secretariat's recommendation.45
G. The Factual Record
As discussed earlier, the preparation of a factual record
pursuant to the NAAEC is not equivalent to a judicial-type ruling.460
In preparing a factual record, the CEC is not required to determine
whether a party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental
laws, nor must it make any recommendations. The objective and
scope of the factual record are simply to investigate and summarize
the relevant information regarding the submission. As Article 15(4)
of the NAAEC states,
In preparing a factual record, the Secretariat shall
consider any information furnished by a Party and may
consider any relevant technical, scientific or other
information: (a) that is publicly available; (b)
submitted by interested non-governmental organiza-
tions or persons; (c) submitted by the Joint Public
Advisory Committee; or (d) developed by the
Secretariat or by independent experts.461
The focus of the factual record was on the substantive, rather
than the procedural, issues in the Cozumel Reef Case. This was
because the main procedural issues, such as standing, direct injury,




459. Id. at 89.
460. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
461. NAAEC, supra note 10, art. 15(4).
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and exhaustion of domestic remedies, had been resolved in the CEC's
earlier determination.462 After summarizing the arguments set forth
in the submission and the response, the factual record sets forth the
evidence supporting each side's interpretation of the dispute. Two of
the key issues that the CEC addressed were the ecological risks to
Cozumel's reefs and whether the Consorcio pier comprised an
integral part ofPuerta Maya Project.
In terms of the ecological risks posed by construction and
operation of the Consorcio pier, the factual record included the
fmdings of three technical experts: Gustavo de la Cruz Arguero,
Mauricio Garduno Andrade, and Dr. Eric Jordan.463 These experts
are all affiliated with the Research and Advanced Studies Center of
the National Engineering Institute in Mexico. In 1994, Consorcio
hired these three consultants to prepare professional opinions for
submission to the INE.464 According to the factual record, the
technical opinions offered contrasting views of the project's
environmental impact.
Arguero concluded that the selection of the site was "optimal
and represent[ed] the lowest ecological burden for the area in
question ... [as] there [was] no coral reef growth within the site.,,465
Andrade offered a more cautious, but nonetheless optimistic review of
the project. Although Andrade conceded that reef structures would
suffer some impact due to the pier construction, he maintained that
"given the type of construction intended to be built, the generation of
sediments [would] not be substantial enough to harm the reef"466
The factual record does not indicate whether the technical opinions of
Arguero or Andrade addressed the ecological impacts of the
operation ofthe pier.
Dr. Jordan provided a very different assessment. Dr. Jordan's
study indicated that "in terms ofthe damage that may be caused to the
coral community in the study area, the costs of the construction of the
new pier [were] very high.,,467 As a result, Dr. Jordan recommended
that the Consorcio pier be built "in another location, in an area where
no coral reefs exist."468 As with the opinions provided by and
462. See supra notes 451-59 and accompanying text.
463. See SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 182-86.
464. Id. at 182.
465. Id. at 183.
466. Id. at 184.
467. Id. at 185.
468. Id.
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Arguero and Andrade, there is no indication that Dr. Jordan actually
addressed the ecological impact of the pier's operation.
In addition to the less than thorough opinions from the three
experts, it is also significant that the factual record failed to mention
the fmdings of the ReefK.eeper Environmental Assessment, prepared
in 1994 by Dr. Pamela Hallock-Muller, Dr. Douglas Fenner, and Dr.
Stephen Cofer-Shabica.469 Article 15(4) of the NAAEC expressly
permits the CEC to consider scientific information from interested
non-governmental organizations and/or independent experts in the
preparation of its factual record.47o As discussed earlier in this paper,
the ReefKeeper Environmental Assessment provided extensive
analysis of pier operation, as well as pier construction, and concluded
that functional and valuable communities would be placed at an
unacceptable risk.471 In light of the international prominence of the
technical experts that conducted the ReefKeeper Environmental
Assessment, it is surprising that the CEC did not mention the study's
results in the factual record.
In terms of whether the Consorcio pier comprised an integral
part ofPuerta Maya Project, the CEC set forth the factual basis for the
contrasting interpretations held by Mexico and the Submitters. In
support of Mexico's position, the factual record noted that, in the
1993 Concession, donation of the federal land for "real estate tourism
develofment" was expressly contingent on the completion of an
EIS.47 The factual record also noted that on December 20, 1996, the
INE expressly notified Consorcio that it had not authorized the
construction of works for Tourist-Commercial use in the 1993
Concession.473 Interestingly, the factual record did not mention that
the INE sent this clarification letter to Consorcio after the Article 14
submission was filed with the CEC. The CEC summarized Mexico's
position that the real estate tourism development had not been
previously approved, and that the environmental impacts of the Puerta
Maya Project were still being reviewed by the govemment.474
In support of the Submitters' position, the factual record made
note of evidence that suggested that both Consorcio and the Mexican
government perceived the pier as an integrated part of the Puerta
469. See supra notes 383-90 and accompanying text.
470. See NAAEC, supra note 10, art. 15(4).
471. See supra notes 383-90 and accompanying text.
472. See SUBMISSION DOCUMENTS, supra note 107, at 167.
473. ld. at 202.
474. ld. at 167.
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Maya Project. This evidence included the SCT's 1990 document
approving the Consorcio pier, which stated that the project was
complemented by 43.3 hectares of real estate and tourist
development,475 and a 1993 letter from Consorcio to the SCT, which
stated' that the pier was only the fIrst stage of the Puerta Maya
Project.476 The factual record also quoted extensively from a 1994
television news story, in which Consorcio's Director of Project and
Construction discussed his company's plans in CozumeI. According
to Consorcio's Director, construction of the Project would take place
in four stages. The fIrst stage
consists ofconstruction of the cruise ship pier, a means
ofaccess to it and its port area, a maritime federal zone
on land, with infrastructure, and a village, which
includes services such as shops, restaurants, bars, a
hotel zone, etc. The second stage includes a golf club,
with villas, and a clubhouse; a third stage includes a
high-rise luxury hotel; and the fourth stage includes a
world-class spa.477
The factual record did not attempt to reconcile or integrate the
evidence concerning the ecological risks to Cozumel's reefs, nor did
it address whether the Consorcio pier constituted an integral part of
the larger Puerta Maya Project. The CEC merely presented the
evidence it deemed signifIcant, and left Mexico, the Submitters, and
the public to draw their own conclusions.478 No conclusory fIndings
or recommendations were made by the CEC.
475. ld. at 162.
476. ld. at 163.
477. ld. (quoting the Director's statement on a 1994 television newscast).
478. In its October 24, 1997 press release announcing the publication of the factual
record, the CEC stated "[t]he factual record does not reach legal conclusions or
determinations. The purpose of the factual record is to clarify the facts as they pertain to
allegations raised by the submitters and information provided by the Parties and public."
Press Release, North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, NAFTA
Environment Ministers Release Cozumel Factual Record to the Public (Oct. 24, 1997) (on
file with the author), available at http://www.cec.orginews/announcelData.cfm?varlan=
english&vardate=9999&unique_no=74 (last visited Jan. 2,2001); Beatrlz Bugeda, Is NAFTA
up to Its Green Expectations? Effective Law Enforcement Under the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 1591, 1611 ("[1]he report
does not include an evaluation or judgment by the Secretariat with respect to those facts and
allegations made by the submitters. The reader of the factual record must draw his or her
own conclusions as to whether the Mexican environmental authorities effectively enforced
their environmental laws.").
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H. The Factual Record's Effect
Although the CEC's factual record did not set forth conclusive
fmdings or specific recommendations, the document did establish two
points that call Mexico's actions, or more accurately Mexico's non-
actions, into serious question. First, the factual record confirmed that
there was credible scientific evidence indicatin~ that the Consorcio
pier would severely damage Cozumel's reefs.4 9 The existence of
such evidence casts doubt on the technical validity of the 1990 EIS.
Second, the factual record confirmed that there were numerous
documents and statements indicating that Consorcio and the Mexican
government envisioned the pro,80sed pier as the first stage of a larger
on-shore tourist development. 80 These documents and statements
cast doubt on the credibility of Mexico's claim that the pier and the
on-shore projects were "distinct" projects, and that the proposed on-
shore tourism development plan was still undergoing meaningful
substantive review.
While the CEC's factual record falls short of a determination
that Mexico is failing to enforce its environmental laws, the findings
above nonetheless strongly suggest that the government's approval
process was of questionable scientific and legal legitimacy.
Regardless of whether one accepts Mexico's argument that the
Cozumel scenario was technically consistent with Mexican
environmental law, it is difficult to read the factual record without
concluding that Mexico's actions were and are inconsistent with
Mexican environmental law and the underlying objectives and
obligations of the NAAEC.
Because the text of the record confirmed many of the
Submitters' allegations, some environmentalists hailed the
preparation and release of the factual record as a triumph. For
instance, Gustavo Alanis, President of the Mexican Center for
Environmental Law, stated that "[w]e proved that the Mexican
government violated the law.... It's an enormous victory for
international environmental rights.,,481 Similarly, Mark Spalding, an
environmental attorney and lecturer at the University of California at
San Diego's Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific
Studies, stated that media coverage of the CEC's probe into the
Cozumel project embarrassed Mexico and paved the way for more
479. See supra notes 467--68 and accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 475-77 and accompanying text.
481. Brandon, supra note 125.
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transparent review of other controversial projects.482 The Mexican
government has taken some preliminary steps that support the hopeful
views of Alanis and Spalding regarding the impact of the factual
record. For instance, following the release of the factual record,
Mexico pledged that it would implement a new management study for
Cozumel Island, and that it would improve laws protecting
endangered coral reefs.483
Other environmentalists, however, did not perceive the CEC's
factual record as a triumph. Rather, they perceived it as proof that the
CEC is an ineffective institution. Dora Uribe, one of the
environmental attorneys who drafted the Cozumel submission to the
CEC, pointed out that "there wasn't one recommendation [in the
factual record]" and that "[t]he only conclusion you can make ... is
that this is another bureaucracy with no power."484 Similarly, Dan
Seligman of the Sierra Club stated, "[t]he public was sold a bill of
goods [with the NAFTA environmental side agreement]. As a
general matter, there was more promised than could possibly be
delivered ...."485 The views expressed by Uribe and Seligman find
support in the fact that, notwithstanding the factual record and
Mexico's pledges to conduct a new study and improve its laws, the
Consorcio pier was completed.486 As the Chicago Tribune reported
in November 1998, the victory was only a paper one. "The Puerta
Maya pier was built, and tourists now disembark from cruise ships
there to stroll its walkway lined with liquor, perfume and souvenir
shops."487
In addition to the CEC's inability to halt the completion of the
Consorcio pier, the political fallout from the Cozumel Reef Case also
482. Susan Ferriss, Environment Lost in NAFTA Translations; Lawbreakers Face No
Penalty, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 2, 1998, at A28.
483. Prepared Testimony ofAmbassador Richard Fisher Deputy United States Trade
Representative Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, Subject-Economic Effects
ofNAFTA, Fed. News Servo (Apr. 13, 1999).
484. Ferriss, supra note 482 (paraphrasing Gustavo Alanis, director of the Mexican
Center for Environmental Law, as saying that "[t]he CEC's attention to the pier ... forced
Mexico to improve its laws to protect endangered reefs and prompted an environmental plan
for the island ofCozumel.").
485. ld.
486. See Brandon, supra note 125; Bugeda, supra note 478, at 1616 ("The truth is that
the procedure had very little impact on the environmental community, and none whatsoever
on the tourist project in Cozumel that led to the submission .... [T]he critics ofthe CEC who
claimed that it was born with no teeth seem to have scored a point.").
487. Brandon, supra note 125.
2001] THE PAPER TIGER AWAKENS 471
suggests that the factual record was something less than a victory.488
Victor Lichtinger was the CEC's Executive Director during the period
when the Cozumel dispute was under review. Lichtinger's decision
to press forward with the Cozumel Reef Case did not endear him to
the government ofMexico.489 Lichtinger also publicly criticized U.S.
EPA Administrator Carol Browner for failing to attend the CEC's
annual meeting of the Council of Ministers and for refusing to insist
that the NAAEC be included in the extension of NAFTA to other
countries, such as Chile.490 In February of 1998, Lichtinger resigned
his position as the CEC's Executive Director.491 Although Mexico
and United States have taken the official position that his resignation
was voluntary, other sources maintain that Lichtinger was essentially
forced out because he was deemed "too environmental."492
Lichtinger's departure was not an encouraging sign for North
American environmentalists.
VII. NORTH AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: UNEQUAL STATUS
WITH TRADE
In reviewing the record of environmental enforcement under
the 1993 North American Regime, at least three basic observations
can be made. First, the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the
United States have not attempted directly to enforce the provisions of
the NAAEC, which require that each country effectively enforce its
environmental laws. Second, although twenty-three private
enforcement submissions have been filed under the NAAEC, the CEC
has, so far, only authorized the release of one factual record. Third,
the one factual record issued by the CEC did not set forth any
488. See Kevin G. Hall, Controversial NAFTA Official Resigns, Was Criticized for
Environmental Focus, J. COM., Feb. 12, 1998, at 1A.
489. Id.
490. Id. ("[Lichtinger] did not shy away from criticizing the lack ofpublic support from
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Carol Browner, whom he and others
felt failed to lobby on behalf of environmental inclusion in trade pacts during congressional
debate over the broad trade pact negotiating authority known as fast track."); Kevin G. Hall,
Resignation Casts Shadow over NAFTA, J. COM., Feb. 13, 1998, at 1A ("[Lichtinger] and his
U.S. director Greg Block were not afraid to take on the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency for not being more publicly supportive of the new NAFTA institution. They took
EPA chief Carol Browner to task for failing to attend a CEC meeting in Pittsburgh last
year.").
491. Hall, supra note 490, at 1A.
492. Seeid.
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conclusions or recommendations and did not stop the completion of
the project complained of in the submission.
Taken together, these observations suggest that the
environmental provisions of the 1993 North American Regime have
not been interpreted as binding international obligations. Rather, they
are currently treated primarily as aspirational principles. In the field
of international law, the distinction between "enforceable" and
"aspirational" law is often discussed in tenns of "hard" versus "soft"
international law.493 These distinctions do not represent separate
categories of international law, but rather represent the end points of
an enforceability spectrum. In tenns of enforceability, the NAAEC is
clearly near the "soft" end ofthe spectrum. This status is the result of
a number of factors.
In part, it is due to the textual provisions of the NAAEC. The
NAAEC does not provide the CEC with independent authority to
bring enforcement actions. It does not provide the CEC or private
parties with a means to enforce the fmdings in an Article 14 factual
record, and it does not provide meaningful remedies for Article 24
enforcement actions brought by the national governments of Canada,
Mexico, and the United States. These textual limitations suggest that
the NAAEC may not have been designed to serve as an enforceable
international document.
In part, however the NAAEC's status as soft international law
is due to the political conditions in Canada, Mexico, and the United
States since the 1993 North American Regime was adopted. Putting
aside the question of whether the NAAEC was initially intended as
soft international law, the three countries have made little, if any,
attempt to "harden" the treaty since it was adopted. Seven yearS after
the NAAEC went into effect, Article 24 remains untested, the national
governments have been successful in dismissing many of the private
submissions filed with the CEC, the fmdings of the only factual
record released by the CEC have been largely ignored, and the CEC's
first Executive Director has resigned amidst criticism that he was too
environmental. Although the textual provisions of the NAAEC are
arguably vague, these provisions do not require that Canada, Mexico,
and the United States take deliberate steps to weaken the treaty. The
NAAEC is worded broadly and is therefore amenable to a variety of
legal interpretations. The three countries must bear responsibility for
their political decision to adopt a restrictive interpretation of the
NAAEC, as well as for their political decision not to utilize the
493. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12
MICH. J. INT'LL. 420 passim (1991).
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enforcement provisions of the agreement. They had the option to
make the NAAEC a political priority and take its obligations
seriously, and they chose not to do so.
In evaluating the effectiveness of the NAAEC, some have
argued that international law is inherently cooperative rather than
coercive, and thus there is no reason to expect or demand that the
NAAEC be enforced in the traditional legal sense. For instance,
Professors Joseph DiMento and Pamela Doughman of the University
of California at Irvine recently published a comprehensive law review
article evaluating implementation of the NAAEC.494 In this article,
DiMento and Doughman state that "[p]erhaps the biggest problem is
that enforcement, if it is to be included in an international agreement,
appears inherently contrary to the spirit of cooperation that is an
essential part of international agreements.,,495 On the one hand, their
statement correctly points out that, under the current international
framework, nations voluntarily choose to be bound by treaties, and
are often wary of delegating enforcement authority to international
institutions. On the other hand, their comment fails to note that in
1993, the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States
represented to the North American ~ublic that the NAAEC
established meaningful legal obligations. 6 It also misses the point
that, in many areas of international law, nations do voluntarily
delegate enforcement powers to international institutions, creating
treaties much "harder" than the NAAEC. One ofthe most noteworthy
examples ofhard international law is international trade law.497
To appreciate the difference between hard and soft
international law, it is useful to compare enforcement under NAFTA
with enforcement under the NAAEC. For instance, when Canada,
Mexico, and the United States (or corporations from these countries)
have reason to suspect that another nation is violating NAFTA's trade
rules, they can seek redress through two dispute resolution
494. DiMento & Doughman, supra note 23.
495. ld. at 731-32 (citing Gilbert R. Winham, Enforcement ofEnvironmental Measures:
Negotiating the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement, 3 1. ENV'T. & DEV. 1, 36-37
(1994)).
496. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
497. See Michael J. Kelly, Bringing a Complaint Under the NAFTA Environmental Side
Accord: Difficult Steps Under a Procedural Paper Tiger But Movement in the Right
Direction, 24 PEPP. L. REv. 71, 96 (1996) ("International trade regimes have been
institutionalized and have grown strong over the past century. Conversely, international
environmental law reflects only a patchwork of treaties and customs between states. It is a
relatively new field of law, and there are no global institutions, like the World Trade
Organization, to present guidance for the enforcement of policies embodied in the Side
Accord.").
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mechanisms. They can initiate the arbitration process under Chapter
19 of NAFTA, or they can file a submission with the Free Trade
Commission under Chapter 20 of NAFTA.498 As of March 2000,
fifty-four claims had been filed under Chapter 19,499 and four claims
had been filed under Chapter 20.s00 In several cases, the resolution of
these claims resulted in the payment of tens of millions of dollars by
national governments.SOI Thus, in the case ofNAFTA, it is clear that
Canada, Mexico, and the United States created effective enforcement
remedies in the treaty and have demonstrated the political res<;>lve to
invoke and comply with the treaty's provisions.S02
In the case of the NAAEC, however, the treaty itself contains
virtually no remedies or sanctions. Moreover, notwithstandil1g the
lack of remedies or sanctions, Canada, Mexico, and the United States
have not yet filed a single claim alleging non-enforcement under the
NAAEC. To date, the only NAAEC enforcement activity has been
under the Article 14 citizen submission process. Because Article 14
does not provide for sanctions, compliance with the NAAEC has so
far relied on the "public shame factor"s03 or the "reputation
factor."s04
As another example, NAFTA permits a private corporation to
bring a direct claim if the corporation believes that a domestic
environmental law resulted in the expropriation of the corporation's
investment,sos Under NAFTA, a private corporation alleging
expropriation can force a government into binding arbitration.S06 To
trigger the binding arbitration process for expropriation claims, a
private corporation need not obtain approval of any national
government or international council.S07 Since NAFTA went into
498. NAFTA, supra note 1, at chs. 19,20.
499. NAFTA Secretariat, Completed NAFTA Panel Reviews, http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/english/index.htm (revised Dec. 20, 2000); NAFTA Secretariat, Active NAFTA
Panel Reviews, http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/english/index.htm (revised Dec. 20, 2000).
500. NAFTA Secretariat, Completed NAFTA Panel Reviews, http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/english/index.htm (revised Dec. 20, 2000); NAFTA Secretariat, Active NAFTA
Panel Reviews, http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/english/index.htm (revised Dec. 20, 2000).
501. Lopez, supra note 104, at 172-84.
S02. See EDITH BROWN WEISS & HAROLD K. JACOBSON, ENGAGING COUNTRIES:
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS S47 (1998)
("In some areas of intemationallaw, such as trade law or national security, sanctions have
been regarded as essential to achieving compliance.").
503. SIMON, supra note 60, at 227.
504. WEISS & JACOBSON, supra note S02, at S43.
505. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1110, 111S-38.
506. Id. arts. IIIS-38.
507. Id.
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effect, several expropriation claims have been filed by private
corporations.508 In the case of the NAAEC, however, private
environmental organizations are denied the rights and remedies
afforded to private corporations under NAFTA. Unlike private
corporations under NAFTA, private environmental groups under the
NAAEC must secure approval of two-thirds of the CEC's Council of
Ministers before an Article 14 claim may proceed. Unlike private
corporations under NAFTA, private environmental organizations
under the NAAEC cannot force national governments into binding
arbitration.
In comparing NAFTA and the NAAEC, it becomes clear that
not all North American law is treated equally. North American trade
law is treated as binding and enforceable, whereas North American
environmental law is treated as non-binding and aspirational. This is
why the NAAEC is commonly referred to as NAFTA's
environmental side agreement, and this is why NAFTA is never
referred to as the NAAEC's trade side agreement. For environmental
advocates, therefore, the task ahead will be to work on upgrading the
legal status of the NAAEC to raise North American environmental
law to the same level as North American trade law.
As environmental advocates in North America work to
strengthen North American environmental law, they might seek
guidance from another regional regime-the European Union.
Geographically, the situation in Europe is somewhat different from
that in North America. The close proximity of the European nations
means that virtually every environmental issue in Europe is a
transborder issue. In the European context, issues such as
contamination of the Danube and the Rhine, or air pollution, simply
cannot be resolved without international governance. In light of these
geographic realities, it is therefore not surprising that European
environmental law is more advanced and enforceable than North
American environmental law. Notwithstanding these geographic
differences, it is instructive to examine the legal process by which
European environmental law evolved.
The European Union began with a trade focus quite similar to
that of the 1993 North American Regime. In 1957, the Treaty of
Rome created the European Economic Community ("EEC") to help
reduce trade barriers and encourage regional economic
508. J. Martin Wagner, International Investment, Expropriate and Environmental
Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 465, 487-501 (1999).
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development.509 Unlike the 1993 North American Regime, however,
the Treaty of Rome also created four autonomous political
institutions: the European Commission, the European Parliament, the
European Council ofMinisters, and the European Court of Justice.510
Collectively, these institutions possessed the power not only to
determine violations, but to adopt newall-European laws.
Although the EEC institutions initially focused on regulating
trade and competition, they soon expanded into other related areas
such as environmental Rrotection. In 1986, the EEC adopted the
Single European Act,5 1 and in 1992 it adopted the Maastricht
Treaty.512 These agreements expanded the EEC's law-making
powers in the environmental field, and transformed the EEC into the
European Union. As a result of this expansion and evolution,
European environmental law has managed to secure legal status close
to, if not equal to, the status of European trade law. As C Ford
Runge, Professor ofEconomics at the University of Minnesota, noted
in his 1994 book Freer Trade, Protected Environment, "the EU has
achieved a level of integration of [trade and environment] that merits
careful attention. Its experience offers evidence to support the
possibility of balancing the forces of trade integration and
environmental protection."513 Swiss legal scholar Andreas Ziegler
reached a similar conclusion in his 1996 book Trade and
Environmental Law in the European Community. Ziegler observes
that although the European Court of Justice initially legitimized
environmental measures on the basis of preserving free trade, the
Court eventually came to consider environmental protection as an
appropriate and independent basis for restricting trade.514
Although the experience of the European Union cannot be
grafted on to North America, the development of European
environmental law does provide some relevant lessons. Most
significantly, by expanding the types of issues it can regulate, and by
creating institutions capable of creating and enforcing environmental
provisions, the European Union evolved into something much more
509. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S.l1.
510. ALEXANDER KIss & DINAH SHELTON, MANuAL OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
19 (1993).
511. Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.I. (L 169) 1,25 I.L.M. 506 (19S6).
512. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 2.
513. RUNGE, supra note 51, at 35.
514. See ANDREAS ZIEGLER, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 138 (1996).
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than a mere free trade agreement. It now has the power and means to
integrate environmental protection into Europe's larger political and
economic framework.
To achieve a similar evolution in North America,
environmental advocates need to press for legal and political change.
Legally, the enforcement and sanction provisions of the NAAEC need
to be strengthened, so that they are comparable to the enforcement
and sanction provisions set forth in NAFTA. Politically, the
governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States need to be
held accountable for their disregard of the NAAEC over the past
seven years. To secure the adoption of NAFTA in 1993, political
commitments were made to environmentalists, and these
commitments have largely been forgotten.515
Environmental advocates in North America need to bring this
point home. Politicians who abandoned the NAAEC after securing
adoption of NAFTA need to understand that there are electoral
consequences for this abandonment. The political costs of
disregarding North American environmental law, and the political
advantages of enforcing North American environmental law, must be
increased.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The 1993 North American Regime and the Cozumel Reef
Case are part of a larger process in international law and
environmental law-the evolution of North American environmental
law. This process has its origins in the transboundary resource
conflicts of the late nineteenth century and is certain to continue well
into the twenty-first century.
The Cozumel Reef Case provided the CEC with its first real
opportunity to exercise its authority. In some respects, the case was
encouraging. It demonstrated the CEC's willingness to press forward
with its environmental work, even in the face of neglect and
resistance from the national governments that created and fund the
commission. In other respects, however, the case was a
disappointment. Although the CEC published a factual record that
strongly suggested that Mexico was violating North American
environmental law, this publication did not stop the Consorcio pier
from being built.
515. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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The ultimate significance of the Cozumel Reef Case, however,
cannot be judged simply by its short-term impact. By revealing the
shortcomings of the NAAEC, the case has prompted a reevaluation of
the environmental record of the 1993 North American Regime. This
reevaluation has led many environmentalists to question whether the
NAAEC, in its current form, is an adequate model going forward.
Many of the environmental groups that lobbied on behalf of the 1993
North American Regime are now taking a step back.516
The erosion of environmental support for the 1993 North
American Regime has far-reaching political consequences. For
example, in September 1998, the U.S. Congress refused to grant
President Clinton fast track authority to negotiate a trade agreement
with Chile.517 Dissatisfaction with the environmental performance of
the 1993 North American Regime was one of the factors that led to
this refusa1.518
As another example, at the December 1999 meeting of the
WorId Trade Organization ("WTO") in Seattle, environmental
organizations-along with human rights groups and labor unions-
organized massive street protests.519 One of protestors' fundamental
criticisms of the WTO was that, under current international trade
rules, domestic environmental laws and international environmental
516. See Slow Road to Fast-Track, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998, at 832 [hereinafter Slow
Road].
Paradoxically, this lack of trust [for Clinton] has its roots in the president's
success in building a pro-NAFTA coalition in 1993. At the time, most
Democrats were opposed to the agreement, which Mr. Clinton inherited from
George Bush. They worried that American workers would be hurt by freer
trade with Mexico because Mexico's looser labor and environmental standards
would give it an unfair advantage. Mr. Clinton put their minds at rest by adding
side accords on labor and the environment. . .. That brought enough Democrats
on board. . .. Four years on, however, those Democrats felt short-changed.
The labor and environment side accords never amounted to much, merely
obliging each NAFTA country to respect its own laws.
Id.
517. See Lake 8agaris, Not Now, NAFTA: Chile and the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 8IERRAMAG., Jan. 1999, at 14.
518. See Slow Road, supra note 516.
Given the rude health of the American economy over the past few years, the
administration's failure to win fast-track authority seems remarkable. It is more
surprising still in view of Mr. Clinton's success, in his first year in office, in
squeezing NAFTA through Congress by forging a coalition between Democrats
and Republicans. 80 why has he failed? In essence, because Congress is
deeply divided over what a fast-track bill should say about labor standards and
the environment.
Id.
519. Michael Elliot, The New Radicals, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1999, at 36-39.
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treaties were being undermined and ignored.520 The ~rotestors in
Seattle played a critical role in derailing the WTO talks. 21 After the
street protests at the WTO meeting in Seattle, a poll by Business Week
magazine found that a majority of Americans favored globalization,
but were concerned about the impacts of free trade.522 According to
the same Business Week poll, by a 52-39 percent margin, these
Americans said they were sympathetic to the Seattle protestors.523
The denial by Congress of fast track authority and the Seattle
protests are telling for at least two reasons. First, they provide
political confirmation that the 1993 North American Regime has not
met public expectations.524 Second, these events evince the evolvin~
diplomatic linkage between environmental policy and trade policy.52
This diplomatic linkage may represent the best strategy to strengthen
North American environmental law. In short, this strategy insists that
North American environmental law be accorded equal status with
North American trade law. It is a straightforward goal, but one that
will take great perseverance to achieve.
520. Jenny Bates & Debra S. Knopman, After Seattle: Can Trade and Environmental
Support Each Other?, THEENVTL. FORUM; Jan.-Feb. 2000, at30, 31.
521. David E. Sanger, The Shipwreck in Seattle, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 5, 1999, at A14.
522. R.C. Longworth, Economic Protestors: They Took to the Streets to Get a Seat at the
Table, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16,2000, at A9.
523. ld.
524. Statistics aside, U.S. public opinion has given NAFTA a resounding thumbs down ....
Side agreements on labor and the environment, added by the Clinton administration
under public pressure, are widely viewed by both supporters and opponents as
toothless. Seventy-three percent of respondents to one U.S. poll agreed that in the
future "labor and environmental issues should be negotiated as part of trade
agreements," not on the side.
Peter Costantini, Trade-Outlook: NAFTA Slouches Toward FTAA, INTER PRESS SERVICE
(Dec. 20, 1998).
525. Representative Sander Levin (D-Michigan), Getting Past Deep Divisions on U.S.
Trade Policy, THE HILL, Jan. 20, 1999, at 29.
In order to forge a new consensus on trade in Congress and in the country at
large, we must confront more squarely the set of issues in this changing nature
of international trade.... Fast-track has twice failed because the
administration tried to finesse the underlying issue of increased trade and
competition with developing countries.... At issue with regard to
environmental standards is not simply that air and water move without regard to
national borders, but that foreign exploitation of the environment impacts our
ability to compete with them economically.
ld.; see also Robert Collier, Clinton Urges Fairer Trade: He Says WTO Should Hear out
Demonstrators, SANFRAN. CHRON., Dec. 2,1999, atA1.
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IX. AUTHOR'S POSTSCRIPT
Although this Article only covers events through March 2000,
events occurred in the late spring, summer, and fall of 2000 that
require brief mention because they bear directly on this Article's
central topic-the Article 14 submission process under the NAAEC.
In response to controversy regarding the Article 14 submission
process, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") released
a paper on March 27, 2000, in which the agency set forth proposed
U.S. government positions on reforming the Article 14 submission
process.526 The EPA paper was prompted by proposals to adopt new
Article 14 implementing guidelines that might restrict the
independence and discretion of the CEC Secretariat. By a letter dated
April 3, 2000, the EPA requested that the U.S. National Advisory
Committee ("U.S. NAC") comment on the proposed U.S. government
positions set forth in the March 27,2000, paper.527
On May 15, 2000, the U.S. NAC sent a letter to the EPA, in
which it asserted, among other things, that:
[t]he public must be provided the opportunity to
provide meaningful input into any discussions among
the parties concerning the Article 14-15 process.
Specifically, the Council should, with the help of the
JPAC [Joint Public Advisory Committee] obtain
public comment on the issues raised by the Parties, and
in particular on the propriety of the Council's
considering them at all, before further substantive
discussions among the Parties take place.528
In response to the May 15, 2000, letter from the U.S. NAC, as
well as complaints from North American environmentalists about the
effectiveness of the Article 14 process, the CEC Council of Ministers
(the "Council") adopted Resolution 00-09 in June 2000.529 By this
resolution, the Council instructed the JPAC to establish a means by
which the public could bring issues concerning the citizen submission
526. National Advisory Committee to the U.S. Representative to the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, NAC Advice No. 2000-2 (May 15, 2000), http://www.epa.gov/
ocem/nac/adl-0520.pdf(last visited Feb. 15,2001).
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Council Resolution 00-09 (June 13, 2000), http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/
council/resolutions/disPJes.cfin?varlan=english&documentID=120 (last visited Jan. 16,
2001).
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process to the attention of the JPAC, which would in turn update the
Council on issues raised.
The JPAC acted swiftly to implement Resolution 00-09.
From July until September 2000, the JPAC held an open comment
period in which the public was invited to submit comments on the
Article 14 (and 15) submission process.530 The JPAC also announced
that workshops on these comments would be held in October 2000 in
Washington DC, in December 2000, in Montreal, and in June 2001 in
Mexico.531 Following the completion of these workshops, the JPAC
planned to release a report to the Council entitled Lessons Learned.
The JPAC anticipated that the Lessons Learned report will be
completed late in the Summer 200l.
I participated in the October 13-14, 2000 JPAC meeting in
Washington DC. At the meeting, the JPAC provided participants
with copies of the public comments that had been submitted. Many
of the public comments submitted to the JPAC, and many of the
people who spoke at the meeting, expressed criticisms similar to those
set forth in my article. For instance, the comments submitted by the
Center for International Environmental Law ("CIEL") noted:
In response to over 30 submissions detailing harms to
public health and the environment, the Council has
only twice directed the Secretariat to examine, and
inform the public about, facts associated with these
harms. By June 2000, over half of the active
submissions (about seventeen) were approximately
two or more years old.... These results do not
achieve original promises made by the Parties to give
the public an opportunity to voice concerns about, and
understand the facts associated with, Party efforts to
implement existing environmental regulations. Instead
they suggest a process mired in politics and Party
efforts to avoid accountability.... Given public
interest in recent actions by the Parties to revise the
citizen submission process, a short-term gain by
Parties to weaken the process would likely lead to
530. Call for Comments on the Draft JPAC Public Review of Issues Concerning the
Implementation and Further Elaboration of Articles 14 and 15 (Released July 31, 2000),
http://www.cec.orglnews/announcelData.cfm?varlan=english&uniqueyo=284 (last visited
Jan. 16,2001).
531. Regina Barba, Bringing the Enforcement Facts to Light: JPAC to Help Resolve
Concems About Implementation ofthe Citizen Submissions Process, TRIo (newsletter of the
NACEC), Fall 2000, http://www.cec.orgltrio/stories/index.cfm?varlan=english&ed=
20001O&id=9 (last visited Jan. 16,2001).
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long-term loss of Party credibility and support for
future trade agreements.532
The conclusions of the JPAC's Lessons Learned report will
not be known until later in 2001. However, if the content of the
public comments submitted to the JPAC and the October 2000 JPAC
meeting provide a preview of this report, the Council, and the
Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. governments, may be the targets of
harsh criticism. Whether this criticism will result in tangible changes
in the Article 14 process, CEC policies, or North American trade-
environment politics remains to be seen.
532. Ann Perrault, Comments on Submission History-Lessons Learned: Submitted by
Centerfor International Environmental Law (Sept. 2000) (on file with the author).
